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A STUDY OF THE UNITED STATES IN
SOUTHEAST ASIA: 1950-1954

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A STUDY OF THE UNITED STATES IN
SOUTHEAST ASIA: 1950-1954

by

Stephen L. Johnson

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Submitted to the
Faculty of the School of International Service
of The American University
in Partial Fulfillment of
the Requirements for the Degree
of
MASTER OF ARTS

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ABSTRACT

This paper presents a case study of the development of United States policies for Southeast Asia, particularly as these policies were developed with respect to Burma, Thailand, and Indochina. There are brief discussions of the history and background of each of these areas, emphasizing their relationships with the United States, for the pre-1945 period and the post-war period to 1950. The major portion of the paper, however, is addressed to the four-year span 1950-1954 when United States interest in Southeast Asia resulted in a greatly-accelerated level of participation in the affairs of the area.

In addition to pointing out the evolution of policies which are still current, there are included discussions of events which brought the United States to the brink of armed intervention in Indochina in 1954 and the role of the United States in the Geneva Conference of that year.

Finally, the background and development of collective security arrangements in the area, with emphasis on SEATO, are detailed.

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PREFACE

Nowhere in the world is the United States commitment to combat communism more active or more demanding than in Southeast Asia. The problems being faced today in the area have their genesis in the period immediately following World War II; the solutions now being sought were begun in 1950 and became institutionalized in the succeeding four years.

The development of United States policies and the actions which resulted from these policies during the period 1950-1954 represented, first, a marked break with previous attitude toward the area and, second, a gradual increase in involvement which reached its apex in 1954. From that time on, the commitment was firm.

The conditions, both foreign and domestic, which brought about this significant change in policy have not yet been subjected to historical analysis. They have, however, been set forth in public documents in sufficient detail to permit chronological description and, in some instances, identification as to relative importance and effect. It is the purpose of this paper to relate those events and circumstances from which United States policies, still in evidence today, were conceived, developed, and instituted.

[illegible]

CHAPTER I

PRE-1945

General

The area stretching roughly four thousand miles from the western border of the Union of Burma through West New Guinea is today known as Southeast Asia--a term which came into general usage only recently. The region is neither a cultural nor a political entity, and there is a marked lack of commonalty among the peoples. In short, it is balkanized demographically, politically, and geographically.

Before World War II, Southeast Asia as a region was little known in the West. Referred to as Further India and Indo-China, the region seemed to be a space between, or buffer. Even nations with important interests in the area--such as, the French, Dutch, and British--disregarded what was not theirs and concentrated only on their own possessions. Other nations, notably the United States, demonstrated interest only in economic matters and, where possible, these were conducted through the European colonial power.

World War II brought with it an awareness of Southeast Asia and a realization of its political and military importance. Not only were the strategic supplies of rubber, tin, and petroleum cut off, and maritime traffic from the Indian Ocean to the Pacific endangered, but, as occupied

territories, the countries of Southeast Asia were potential battlegrounds. In such circumstances, there was a resurgence of interest in the area, particularly by the United States. In no instance, however, did a Western nation, regardless of the degree of its interest in the area, appreciate or understand the extent or import of what was happening there.

Under Japanese occupation, the peoples of Southeast Asia found a suitable climate in which to pursue nationalistic goals. The "Asia For The Asians" program of the Japanese held understandable appeal for the people, particularly those who were colonials. By the time that disenchantment had set in and it was recognized that "Asia For The Asians" really meant "Asia For The Japanese," the people had had a chance to appreciate life free from Western domination.

For the first time in history, the entire area was under a single authority. All governments, regardless of the degree of freedom they seemed to have, were under common direction and control by Japan. This version of unification did not last long enough to have implanted a lasting seed of regional affinity, but it did serve to emphasize the importance of looking closely at one's neighbors.

The stimulus given to nationalism by World War II set in motion forces which, from that time on, could not be

accepted, the Committee on Japanese Affairs were not
 successful. In such circumstances, there was a
 sense of defeat in the room, particularly in the United
 States. In no instance, however, did a Western nation
 recognize of the degree of its interest in the war, and
 this is understood and stated on report of what was
 the case.

Under Japanese domination, the people of Manchuria
 and Korea were treated in which the people were
 treated. The "State for the People" program of the
 Japanese was fundamentally based on the people's
 early years were dominated by the State. The
 government was not in fact a real government but a
 the State. Early years were for the Japanese, and people
 had had a chance to experience life from within
 domination.

For the first time in history, the entire world was
 under a single authority. All governments, regardless of
 the degree of freedom they enjoyed in their own domain
 accepted the control of Japan. This system of unification
 did not last long enough to have introduced a lasting sense of
 regional unity, but it did serve to dominate the world.
 The Japanese people in Manchuria by this time had
 in their hands the keys that also had their people.

denied. During the Japanese occupation, the people experienced a change--a different manner of living--from life as colonials. Even when the majority of Japanese actions were disliked, some, such as encouraging the use of the native language, were welcome changes. It was pleasant to look upon one's own people as the equals of any. It was habit forming, too!

In Southeast Asia, nationalism emerged from the war firmly in control of the hearts and minds of the people. Colonialism in the area was doomed and European authority was more fiction than fact. In place of Western domination, self-determination became the way of life.

In the remainder of this paper, discussion will be confined to those countries which comprise the northern tier of Southeast Asia--Burma, Indochina, and Thailand.¹ Frequently referred to as the "rice bowl," these three are the major source of foods in Southeast Asia. As such, they hold an interest for their neighbor to the north that is not duplicated by any other part of Southeast Asia.

Historically, the backgrounds of the three are diverse: one has been free; one gained independence peaceably; and one turned to open rebellion to become free. Politically,

¹Throughout this paper, the name Thailand is used even for discussions covering those periods of pre-1939 and 1946 to 1949 when the official name was Siam.

desired. During the Japanese occupation, the people enjoyed
 great freedom—a freedom known to living—free life as
 colonialists. Even when the majority of Japanese people were
 killed, some, such as encouraging the use of the native
 language, were seldom changed. It was pleasant to look
 upon one's own people in the spirit of life. It was quite
 young, too.

In Japanese Asia, nationalist groups took the
 form of control of the people and mind of the people.
 Colonialism in the area was strong and thorough, although
 was more liberal than elsewhere. In place of Western imperialism,
 self-determination became the way of life.

In the countries of Asia, Japan, Indonesia with the
 control of these countries which comprises the western part
 of Indonesia (Indonesia, Indonesia, and Thailand).
 Japan's policy in the "Asian bowl" was to have the
 major source of food in Southeast Asia. As such, they held
 an interest for their people in the Asian bowl in the
 development of the Asian bowl of Southeast Asia.

Consequently, the development of the Asian bowl and the
 Asian bowl was from the Asian bowl (Indonesia, Indonesia,
 and the Asian bowl of open competition to become free. Politically,

¹The word "Asian bowl" is used in the same sense as the word "Asian bowl" is used
 even for discussion covering the period of 1945-1949 and
 1949 to 1954 when the Asian bowl was still.

they encompass the extremes of the East-West spectrum, ranging from alliance with the West through neutralism to communist-supported revolt. Geographically, they represent what President Eisenhower referred to as the "cork in the bottle" as preventing the southward expansion of communism from China. In effect, all the major problems which beset Southeast Asia are to be found in large measure in one or more of these three countries. And because of their proximity to China and their obvious assets, their strategic importance to the West is as great as that of any of the countries in the area.

Thailand

The first treaty between the United States and any Southeast Asian country was one of amity and commerce with Thailand in 1833. Historically non-colonial throughout the nineteenth century, Thailand was an island of independence surrounded by areas under the control of European powers. That it was able to maintain its independence in the face of concerted efforts by European countries to expand the areas under their control is a tribute to its diplomacy and to its ability to bend with the pressure without breaking. This talent--or capability, at least--was clearly demonstrated by Thailand's role in World War II.

In the late 1930's, Thailand pursued a policy of not antagonizing Great Britain, who still possessed considerable

they announce the extension of the East-West spending, and they have likewise also the West-Southwest spending in the United States. They are, of course, not only interested in the United States but also in the Soviet Union. They are interested in the United States because of the economic expansion of Communism from China. In effect, all the major problems which bear on the United States are to be found in large measure in one or more of these four countries. And because of their economic unity to China and Soviet Union, their strategic importance to the West is as great as that of any of the countries in the East.

Thailand

The first treaty between the United States and any Southeast Asian country was one of ally and commerce with Thailand in 1912. Historically neo-colonial throughout the nineteenth century, Thailand was an island of independence surrounded by areas under the control of European powers. That it was able to maintain its independence in the face of concerted efforts by European countries to expand the areas under their control is a tribute to its diplomacy and to its ability to bend with the pressure without breaking. This ability was especially, at least, demonstrated by Thailand's role in World War II.

In the late 1940s, Thailand pursued a policy of not encroaching Great Britain, and still possesses considerable

power in the area, while at the same time cultivating the rising Japan. In 1939 and 1940, developments in Europe--particularly, the success of Germany and the alliance between Japan and Germany--moved Thailand to a more openly pro-Japanese position. Coincident with Japan's move into Indochina, Thailand signed a new treaty of friendship with Tokyo. Premier Pibul Songgram seemed convinced that war was coming and that Japan would be on the winning side. Accordingly, a policy of assisting and emulating the Japanese appeared to be prudent.

With the coming of World War II in the Pacific, Japan's hegemony over Thailand was firmly established. On December 8, 1941, Japanese troops landed on the southern coast of Thailand and "requested" permission to cross toward Burma; permission was readily granted. Less than two weeks later, Japan and Thailand signed a formal alliance; and on January 25, 1942, Thailand formally declared war upon the United States and Great Britain--a condition which was duly recognized and accepted by the United Kingdom but not by the United States.²

Having aligned herself with Japan, with Japanese encouragement Thailand proceeded to acquire territory at the

²A. Vandebusch and R. Butwell, Southeast Asia Among the World Powers (Lexington, Kentucky: University of Kentucky Press, 1957), p. 160.

power in the area, while at the same time supporting the
 rising Japan. In 1911 and 1912, Japanese in Europe
 particularly, the success of Germany and the alliance
 between Japan and Germany moved Britain to a more openly
 anti-Japanese position. Coinciding with Japan's move into
 Manchuria, Britain signed a new treaty of friendship with
 Japan, Premier Lloyd George seemed convinced that such a
 treaty was not only good for the British Empire, but also
 for the world, a policy of restraint and limiting the Japanese
 expansion in the Pacific.

With the coming of World War II in the Pacific,
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 United Kingdom.⁵

During the period between the two wars, the Japanese em-
 perorship Thailand proceeded to acquire territory in the

⁵ A. V. Kishinevsky and G. K. Kishinevsky, *Thailand and the Pacific*
 the Pacific War, London, 1945, p. 100.
 (London, 1945, 1947), p. 100.

expense of her neighbors. Thailand seized the four northern states of Malaya and two Shan states of Burma from the United Kingdom plus some territory from the French in Indochina. This territorial expansion was, however, to prove to be far more troublesome than beneficial.

In 1944, either through good fortune or commendable foresight, the pro-Japanese government of Pibul Songgram was replaced by the more conservative and pro-Allied government of Pridi Panomyong. From that time until the surrender of the Japanese, Thailand's efforts were directed at lessening the degree of collaboration with Japan.

Of the countries of Southeast Asia, Thailand's experiences during World War II had the least subsequent effect upon her post-war role and development. The flexibility of her foreign policy, together with an opportunism of considerable magnitude, permitted her to change political direction as the situation seemed to demand. The end of the war found her in a position analogous to that of Italy in Europe; her reputation was a little tarnished but the ill effects were to be short lived. Insofar as the United States was concerned, Thailand remained an old and valued friend whose recent activities were not really indicative of her true self.

Burma

A British colony since 1886, Burma had achieved some

measure of self-government in the years between World Wars I and II, but realization of independence first came with Japanese occupation in World War II.

British concessions to Burmese desires for self-government had been gradual but nevertheless positive. By 1939, Burmese controlled the cultural functions of their government as well as the economically important forestry department. Britain retained control of the police and of financial matters. What the Burmese hoped to attain at that time was full dominion status within the Commonwealth once the war in Europe was over; and with that in mind, Premier U Saw visited the United Kingdom in October and November, 1941. He was not successful in his quest, however, and en route home he contacted Japanese officials concerning their plans for Burma in the event of war in the Far East. The British discovered this activity while U Saw was still en route and, as a safety measure, interned him in Uganda for the duration of the war.³

Japanese intentions for Burma were soon made known. In early December, 1941, Japanese forces invaded Burma from the north and, by the time the rainy season began in May, 1942, victory was complete. A nucleus Burma Independent Army (BIA) had accompanied the invasion forces, and the

³J. F. Cady, A History of Modern Burma (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1958), p. 432.

He was not successful in his quest, however, and on 20 June 1941 he contacted Japanese officials concerning their plans for Russia in the event of war in the Far East. The British Ambassador told him that while V was still so young and inexperienced, it was not advisable for him to be in Japan for the duration of the war.

very little had accompanied the invasion forces, and the
1941, aircraft was damaged. A further strike independent
the next day, by the time the rainy season began in May,
On early December, 1941, Japanese forces invaded Burma from
Japanese reinforcements for India were soon made known.

Japanese expanded this nucleus once victory was gained in the hopes of using the BIA to maintain internal order. Cruelty and inhuman treatment, however, caused the Burmese people to cool rapidly in their liking for the Japanese and, by 1943, organized resistance had begun. Resistance efforts, largely centered in the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPFL),⁴ reached a peak in March, 1945, when open military rebellion broke out. The Japanese-trained BIA became the fighting force for the AFPFL and cooperated closely with British forces in the final defeat of the Japanese in Burma.

Independence, at least in name, came to Burma in August, 1943, when a puppet government under Ba Maw was established and Japan declared Burma to be an independent state. This "independence," however, did not mean a lessening of Japanese domination for their army continued to exercise practical control over the country.

Yet, despite the shortcomings of independence under Japanese supervision, Burma had, by the end of the war, experienced enough of the problems and responsibilities of self-government to be firmly convinced of her ability

⁴The AFPFL was formed by the grouping of dissident elements; such as, the People's Revolutionary Front, the Communists, and the Burma Defense Army. That such diverse organizations could be united was due mainly to the leadership of Aung San, an ardent nationalist who became the leader of the anti-Japanese movement during the war.

Japanese government and military were joined in
 the hope of using the so-called Japanese
 democracy and economic resources, created the
 people of good example in their living for the Japanese and
 by 1941, organized resistance and began. Japanese
 policy consisted in the anti-United States Japan
 (1941),² reached a peak in March, 1942, when the military
 revolution broke out. The Japanese-trained and
 fighting force for the Axis had developed closely with
 British forces in the final stages of the Japanese in China.
 Independence, at least in Asia, was to be in
 1942, with a United States and Japan in the
 American and Japan fought hard to be an independent
 state. This "independence" however, did not mean a
 top of Japanese government for every country to
 exercise political control over the country.
 Yet, despite the shortcomings of independence
 American imperialism, from the end of the war,
 continued work of the Japanese and American
 self-government to be fully conscious of her ability.

²The Axis was formed by the signing of the
 German, Italy and Japan's Tripartite Pact, the
 Communists, and the Soviet Union. The Axis
 organization could be called the Axis to the
 end of the war, as the Soviet Union and
 leaders of the Axis-Soviet system during the war.

effectively to cope with them unaided. Her previous desires for independence were strengthened.

Indochina

French colonialism in Indochina began in the seventeenth century and, by the end of the nineteenth, the French Union of Indochina had been assembled. It comprised the colony of Cochin China and the protectorates of Annam, Tongking, Laos, and Cambodia; all five territories were ruled by one administration under a governor general.

The beginning of World War II marked the beginning of the demise of French control of Indochina. With France preoccupied with affairs at home, Japan took advantage of the opportunity, first, to extend its blockade of China to the Indochinese border and, after the fall of France, to begin actual occupation of Vietnam. By 1941, the whole of Indochina was occupied.

Until March, 1945, the Japanese left the administration of Indochina in the hands of the local French officials and, thus, tended to preserve the fiction of French rule. In actuality, French control and prestige were myths from the time the Japanese occupied Indochina. The fact that the regime was directed from Tokyo and that a European would acquiesce so readily to Oriental control was not lost on the Indochinese.

Nationalism in Indochina had begun in earnest during

effectively to deal with them. The French wanted for Indochina a more effective administration.

Indochina

French colonialism in Indochina began in the 17th century and, by the end of the 19th century, the French Union of Indochina had been established. It consisted of the colony of Cochinchina and the protectorates of Annam, Tonkin, Laos, and Cambodia. All five territories were ruled by one administration under a governor-general.

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Until March, 1945, the Japanese left the administration of Indochina in the hands of the local French officials and, even, handed to them the function of French rule. In actuality, French control and prestige were gone from the time the Japanese occupied Indochina. The fact that the regime was allowed to remain there was that a European would be able to handle the situation and not a Japanese. Indochina.

Indochina in Indochina and began in 1945 during

World War I when France brought one hundred thousand Indo-chinese troops to Europe.⁵ These troops, exposed to Western democratic concepts, returned to Indochina to become active supporters of the nationalistic movement. Although nationalism continued to flourish in the years between the wars, World War II provided conditions to insure its success.

The underground resistance in Indochina was centered in the nationalist movement of Vietnam. French cooperation with the Japanese in suppressing the resistance strengthened the anti-French as well as anti-Japanese purpose of these forces. In May, 1941, the Vietnamese communist party, under Ho Chi Minh, formed the Vietminh or Vietnam Independence League. This organization, under the banner of anti-imperialism, French or Japanese, was able to present a national united front composed of all classes and factions. Guerrilla forces were organized and succeeded in gaining control of some rural areas in the north. By 1944, a liberation army had been formed and resistance activities were expanded into south Vietnam.

The communist political domination of the Vietminh was apparent from the first; and, as its area of activity was expanded, so was communist doctrine spread.

In March, 1945, the Japanese became increasingly

⁵Vandenbusch and Butwell, op. cit., p. 112.

After the 1945 election, the Japanese government had to deal with the problem of the Japanese people's economic recovery. The Japanese government had to deal with the problem of the Japanese people's economic recovery. The Japanese government had to deal with the problem of the Japanese people's economic recovery.

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concerned over the possibility of Allied landings in Indochina and the accompanying possibility that the French might then join the Allied side. In order to forestall any early defection by the French, Japan sought even closer cooperation with them in the defense of the colony. When the French refused this, Japanese troops disarmed them and arrested the French officials. Puppet governments were established in Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam; and the end of colonial status for each was declared. The Vietminh, however, refused to recognize the authority of these dependent governments and continued its fight against the Japanese.

The overthrow of the French on March 9 was the actual end of French rule in Indochina. Before then, despite Japanese supervision, the French had continued to govern, at least in name. To many in the rural areas where the Japanese were few, French control was apparently little changed. Now when the officials were interned and imprisoned, even this last vestige faded. Thus, as the Japanese were defeated, the only accepted unifying influence left in Indochina was the Vietminh. The government of the pro-French Bao Dai did not long survive the end of the war in Vietnam for a Vietminh government was formally proclaimed on September 2.⁶

⁶This period is covered in interesting detail by E. J. Hammer in The Emergence of Vietnam (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1947).

continued from the possibility of Allied intervention in Indochina and the accompanying possibility that the French might then join the Allied side. In order to forestall any early detection by the French, Japan issued a statement to the effect that the war in the Pacific was the business of the Pacific. From the French viewpoint, Japan's policy appeared that the French and Japanese governments were engaged in a common effort. The Japanese, on the other hand, claimed that the war was a common effort. The Japanese, however, refused to recognize the authority of French government and continued its fight against the Japanese.

The outbreak of the French on March 9 was the actual end of French rule in Indochina. Before this, Japan's Japanese expedition, the French had continued to govern, at least in name. To many in the French press, the Japanese were the French control was apparently still engaged. Now when the Japanese were Japanese and Indochina, even this last vestige of French rule, as the Japanese were defeated, the only accepted authority remained left in Indochina was the Japanese. The government of the French Republic was not and never has been at the end of the war in Indochina and a Japanese government was formally proclaimed on September 2.

¹This article is based on information received by the United States Department of State from the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo, September 2, 1945.

There was one final incident which, in the circumstances, further strengthened the Vietminh and widened the gap between French colonialism and Indochinese nationalism. The Japanese surrendered to the Chinese in Tongking and the Vietminh were permitted by the Chinese to gain a much firmer foothold than would have been possible had the French themselves taken the surrender.

The attitude of the United States was one of interest in the Indochinese people but, in the final analysis, the United States remained aloof from developments in Indochina in 1945. President Roosevelt, according to his Secretary of State, was an advocate of a plan to put Indochina under a trusteeship once the war was ended.⁷ Once this plan no longer had his active support, however, it floundered and the return of the French to Indochina was not opposed by the United States.

⁷C. Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New York: Macmillan, 1948), p. 1596.

There was one final incident which, in the circumstances, further emphasized the situation and which was not without its own interest and importance. The Chinese in Hong Kong and the Chinese in Shanghai were both in a position to give a more detailed account of the situation and the Chinese in Shanghai would have been able to give a more detailed account of the situation.

The version of the United States and one of its allies in the International People's War, in the final analysis, was not a very different one from the version in the Chinese in Hong Kong and the Chinese in Shanghai. In 1941, the Chinese in Shanghai, according to the version of the Chinese in Hong Kong, was in a position to give a more detailed account of the situation and the Chinese in Shanghai would have been able to give a more detailed account of the situation.

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CHAPTER II

POST-WAR YEARS (1945-1950)

General

At the end of World War II, the United States emerged as a symbol of hope to much of Southeast Asia, not only because of a history of anti-colonialism but also because of the position of power held. For the United States, however, there were other areas in the world which rated a higher priority consideration. The result was that, with minor exceptions, interest in Southeast Asia was limited and involvement minimal.

In retrospect, there is much to support the allegation that the United States misread the depth and strength of colonial Asian independence movements. Where these movements looked to the United States, as a strong advocate of self-determination, for assistance in ridding themselves of colonialism, they were greeted by bewildering neutrality. With the exception of the Philippines, the United States considered independence problems in Southeast Asia as not of immediate interest. In general, the most forthright demonstration of anti-colonialism by the United States was the diplomatic recognition extended to the new states once they

had secured their freedom.¹ The reaction of the United States to problems in Southeast Asia was largely conditioned by events in other parts of the world. In particular, the situation in Europe played a determining role in United States policy and actions. There were, however, exponents of a more pro-Asian policy within the government and their success in some instances was significant.²

In an attempt to be the friend of all and enemy of none, the United States sought to avoid any position which might given offense to either nationalist or colonial elements. Generally, the result was that both were offended.

Involvement in the Philippines and in Indonesia were isolated examples of affirmative action on the part of the United States. In the case of the Philippines, granting the Islands independence in 1946 was a widely-applauded action which was not made less creditable by the fact that it was pursuant to a promise of long standing. For the colonies of Southeast Asia, it was an example which they hoped other Western nations would follow.

¹F. Low, Struggle for Asia (New York: F. A. Praeger, 1955), p. 109.

²G. M. Kahan, in a paper prepared for a conference on "Southeast Asia in the Coming World" in August, 1952, cited the Southeast Asia division of the Department of State as the focus of this pro-Asian group. Their success, according to Mr. Kahan, was particularly discernible in our dealings with Thailand.

and secured more respect. The position of the United States in relation to domestic law was largely unaffected by events in other parts of the world. In particular, the situation in Europe played a determining role in United States policy and action. There were, however, elements of a new division policy within the government and their impact in some instances was significant.

In an attempt to bring the kind of all-out money to bear, the United States moved to avoid any position which might give others an unfair advantage on colonial matters. Generally, the United States was both more concerned, however, in the long run and in the short run. The United States was also more active in the past of the United States. In the case of the Philippines, during the United States in 1944 was a widely-spread action which was not made less desirable by the fact that it was presented as a matter of long standing. For the purpose of United States, it was an action that had been taken. United States action followed.

The United States was also more active in the past of the United States. In the case of the Philippines, during the United States in 1944 was a widely-spread action which was not made less desirable by the fact that it was presented as a matter of long standing. For the purpose of United States, it was an action that had been taken. United States action followed.

The United States entered the Dutch-Indonesian dispute only after the affair had reached the U.N. Security Council and could no longer be overlooked. Nevertheless, the role of the United States in assisting the transition from colony to free state was recognized and appreciated. These two instances were, however, glaring exceptions to the normal policy of aloofness.

The loss of China to communism brought with it a host of new problems. Not only was China, on whom the United States depended for stability in the Far East, now openly antagonistic but communism was now on the threshold of Southeast Asia. The time was more than ripe for a reappraisal of United States policies and programs for the area. But even in these circumstances, the situation in Europe played a disproportionate role in determining United States policy in Asia.

The late forties saw the rise of NATO, with its need for European armies, as well as the adoption by the United States of a policy of containment of communism. The latter now became particularly applicable to Southeast Asia; and since stability in the area is a prerequisite for the success of containment, stability in Southeast Asia became vital. Moreover, stability in Indochina and Indonesia would permit the return of French and Dutch troops to Europe, where they were needed.

The United States supports the international system of free trade and open markets. It has been only since the attack was launched on U.S. security, Communist and Soviet on foreign, the international, that the role of the United States in creating the situation from which we have been removed and oppressed. These are limited facts, however, giving background to the general policy of containment.

The role of China in Communist foreign policy is a key of our foreign policy. Not only was China, so when the United States began to stand by the 1949, now openly antagonistic but Communist was now on the brink of a new era. The aim was not only to keep the United States out of United States policy and progress for the area. But even in these circumstances, the situation in Europe played a disproportionate role in determining United States policy in Asia.

The late 1940s saw the rise of NATO, with its need for European unity, as well as the adoption by the United States of a policy of containment of Communism. The latter was primarily applied to Europe, Asia, and since 1949 in the area is a preoccupation for the United States. Containment, stability in Southeast Asia, Vietnam, Korea, stability in Indochina and Indonesia would permit the return of French and Dutch troops to Europe, where they were needed.

In the Congress, increasing amounts of rhetoric were addressed to the question of United States policies and actions in the Far East. Comments by Senators Bridges, Taft, Brewster, and Vandenberg expressed concern for the inadequacies of United States planning with regard to China.³ In the House, Mr. Judd was outspoken in his criticism of our Asian policies.⁴ Bipartisan foreign policy was sorely tested by Senator Knowland's "Concurrent Resolution to Investigate Foreign Policy in the Far East," which he submitted on April 21, 1949. It was a broad proposal to

ascertain our present policy in the Far East and what policies have heretofore been followed by the U.S. in regard to Far Eastern affairs and to evaluate and determine the effect of such policies.⁵

While the remarks mainly concerned China, they were also applicable to Southeast Asia.

American policy adjustments were obviously necessary, and the latter part of 1949 saw considerable activity in this regard. A searching review and evaluation of United States policy in the Far East was begun by Mr. Raymond B. Fosdick and Dr. Everett Case, working with Ambassador-at-Large Jessup. Other personnel within the Department of

³United States Congress, Congressional Record, 81st Congress, 1st Session (Washington: Government Printing Office), p. 8293.

⁴Ibid., p. A2725.

⁵Ibid., p. 4862.

in the country, including members of various
addressed on the question of United States policies and
action in the Far East. Comments by American citizens,
Tate, Gervais, and Henderson followed in the
introduction of William H. Hall, standing with regard to China.
in the House, 1941 and continued in his criticism of our
policy in China. A statement by American citizens was made.
before by American citizens. A statement by American citizens was
investigate Chinese policy in the Far East, which he has
addressed on April 27, 1941. He was a member of the
committee and passed away in the Far East and was
policy have been followed by the U.S. in
policy of the United States and its citizens was
determined the future of our policy.

State were similarly occupied.⁶ A new set of guide lines was being prepared, guide lines which, for the first time, would consider the area as a whole.

Thailand

The end of the war in the Pacific brought British troops to Thailand to receive the surrender of the Japanese forces stationed there. The Allies had no detailed, specific policy concerning the liberation of Southeast Asia; and since the British controlled the Southeast Asian Command, it fell to them to supervise the Japanese surrender in all of that area except northern Indochina.

Concurrent with receiving the surrender of the Japanese troops in Thailand, the United Kingdom took the opportunity to present the Thais with the terms under which the state of war between the two countries could be ended. Contrary to the position taken by the United States, Britain considered Thailand to be a defeated enemy and not a liberated country. Thailand had committed hostile acts against British territory in Malaya and Burma, and these acts were not to be easily overlooked by London. Accordingly, Anglo-Thai relationships were of the victor-vanquished category, and the demands made by Britain were for full retribution for losses suffered. Included in these original demands

⁶Department of State Bulletin, 15 August 1949, p. 236.

were British control of Thailand's civil service, British regulation of exports, and establishment of a British protectorate over Thailand until such a time as Thailand would be admitted to the United Nations.⁷

These demands were regarded as excessive by both the United States and China.⁸ At American instigation, the question of Thailand's indemnity to the United Kingdom was the subject of U.S.-U.K. discussions, and more moderate demands were agreed upon. On January 1, 1946, Britain and Thailand concluded a treaty of peace which provided for the return to Britain of the four Malayan and two Burman provinces plus payment of damages by the delivery of 1.5 million tons of rice to British-controlled territories.⁹ Thailand was, at last, officially at peace.¹⁰

Because of the refusal of the United States to recognize the existence of a state of war between them, U.S.-Thai

⁷F. H. Michael and G. E. Taylor, The Far East in the Modern World (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1956), p. 607.

⁸H. M. Vinacke, A History of The Far East in Modern Times (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1959), p. 776.

⁹L. S. Finkelstein, American Policy in Southeast Asia (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, Inc., 1951), p. 9.

¹⁰Either at British request or as a gesture of good will, Thailand resumed the name Siam in an effort to play down the irredentism which had led to the wartime seizure of British states in Burma and Malaya.

relations were resumed as though little had happened. The insistence of the United States that the wartime government of Thailand had not represented the true feelings of the people, plus the "Free Thai" movement which had aided the Allies throughout the war, did much to ease the path of Thailand in regaining a position of respectability in the world. In late 1946, Thailand applied for admission to the UN and, in 1947, became the fifty-fifth member of the organization.

In November, 1947, the collaborationist wartime Premier, Songgram, overthrew the government which had replaced him in 1944 and, with elections, regained the premiership. The two years since the end of the war had all but erased the Western powers' dislike of Songgram, and no opposition was offered to his return. The deposed Premier, Pridi Panomyong fled the country and remained quiescent until 1954.

The Songgram government proved itself to be unfettered by its wartime anti-Western alignment. In a demonstration of flexibility in foreign policy, Songgram aligned his nation firmly on the side of the West.

Several factors contributed to this decision. First was the non-colonial history of Thailand. There was no intense anti-Western feeling and no emotional deterrent to cooperating with the West. Second was the good will built up by the United States in the first post-war years. It was

appreciated by the Thais that a large measure of credit was due the United States for its part in mitigating the terms of the Anglo-Thai peace treaty.

Thailand was a unique example of success for the United States in Southeast Asia. Since Thailand had no direct European ties, U.S. policies toward her were not viewed in the same light as were policies toward the colonial areas. Moreover, the absence of conflict for self-determination permitted the United States to act affirmatively rather than attempt to remain friends with both sides of the dispute. The result was that, with the possible exception of the Philippines, no other country in Southeast Asia was a comparable reservoir of pro-U.S. sentiment.

Burma

Post-war Burma represented the nadir of activity on the part of the United States in support of the principle of self-determination. Whether this inactivity resulted from a lack of knowledge of what was going on there, from apathy, or from an overriding desire to avoid interfering in British affairs, two years had elapsed before the United States even voiced approval of the negotiations which led to Burmese independence.¹¹

¹¹Department of State Bulletin, September 28, 1947, p. 648.

With the defeat of the Japanese in Burma by British forces supported by the Burma Independence Army (BIA), the British sought to establish the pre-war form of government. The Burmese, however, were determined not to accept this and, led by the Anti-Fascist Peoples Freedom League (AFPFL) under Aung San, resistance grew rapidly. What Burma wanted--and considered itself qualified for--was the right to determine its own future without British intervention.

The impasse between Britain and Burma was resolved mainly because of the belated recognition by the British Labour government that accommodation to Burmese demands was the lesser of two evils. Accordingly, negotiations leading toward independence were begun in London in January, 1947. Independence was proclaimed in January, 1948, and, in April, 1948, the Union of Burma was admitted to the UN as its fifty-eighth member.

Internal stability became the major problem confronting the new nation and it was to this that the majority of governmental effort was directed.¹² The communists, in 1947, had renounced the AFPFL for the alleged pro-British attitude of the League; and, when independence was proclaimed, civil war erupted. For a decade the government would be faced with internal conflict from both the Red

¹²T. Kalijarvi and Associates, Modern World Politics (New York: T. Y. Crowell Co., 1961), p. 579.

...the release of the Japanese in Formosa by British
 forces supported by the United States Navy (USN). The
 British sought to establish the post-war form of government.
 The Japanese, however, were determined not to accept this and
 led by the Anti-Communist League (ACL) under
 Wang Jing, resistance grew rapidly. This form ended—and
 continued itself until 1945—and the story of resistance
 is one of a bitter battle for survival.

The Japanese invasion of China and the resulting
 mainly because of the failed recognition by the British
 Labour government that recognition of Chinese demands was
 the basis of our policy. Consequently, opposition leading
 to the formation of the Chinese Nationalist Government (CNG) in January, 1945.

Independence was proclaimed in January, 1946, and, in April,
 1946, the Union of China was admitted to the UN as the fifty-
 eighth member.

Internal stability became the major problem confronting
 the new nation and it was in this that the majority of
 government effort was directed. The Committee, in
 1947, had recommended the UN for the alleged pro-British
 attitude of the Chinese and, when independence was pro-
 claimed, civil war erupted. For a decade the government
 would be faced with internal conflict from both the Red

(Trotsky) and White (Stalin) Communists and from the Karen tribes in the lower part of Burma. In 1948 and 1949, there were times when the rebels held more of Burma than did the government.¹³

From the beginning, Burma's foreign policy was formulated in the light of two conditions: the first was the proximity of China and the second was the depth of anti-colonial feeling. An appreciation of the need to avoid antagonizing the giant to the north, particularly after the defeat of the Nationalist Chinese, dictated a neutralist behavior with slight anti-West overtones. Burma was the first non-communist nation to recognize Communist China.¹⁴

Indochina

Throughout the war, while governing under Japanese supervision and especially when replaced by a puppet government, the French believed that all that was necessary to regain complete control of Indochina was to have the war end. From the beginning of the post-war period, however, this proved to be a misconception of the first order.

The liberation of Indochina was accomplished by

¹³A. Vandenbusch & R. Butwell, Southeast Asia Among the World Powers (Lexington, Kentucky: University of Kentucky Press, 1957), p. 231.

¹⁴A. D. Barnett, Communist China and Asia (New York: Vintage Books, 1960), p. 321.

(Tientsin and other cities) and from the fact that in the latter part of 1949, when there were some 100,000 Chinese in the city, the government.

From the beginning, China's foreign policy was based on the principle of two conditions: the first was the equality of China and the second was the right of anti-colonial feeling. In recognition of the need to avoid antagonizing the West, particularly after the entry of the Nationalist Chinese, dictated a neutralist behavior with regard to the Communists. China was the first non-Communist nation to recognize Communist China.¹²

Indonesia

Throughout the war, while governed under Japanese occupation and especially when replaced by a puppet government, the French believed that all that was necessary to regain complete control of Indonesia was to have the war end. From the beginning of the post-war period, however, this proved to be a misconception of the first order. The liberation of Indonesia was accomplished by

¹² A. V. Vaidyanathan, *Indonesian Asia* (London: The World Press, 1957), p. 131.

¹³ A. V. Vaidyanathan, *Indonesian Asia* (London: The World Press, 1957), p. 131.

British forces in the south and Chinese troops in the north; and, from the beginning, the liberating armies differed in their treatment of the returning French. In the south, the British supported the restoration of the pre-war government and expedited as much as possible the actual turnover of administration to the French. In the north, the Chinese pursued a policy of neutralism between the Vietminh and the French and delayed in withdrawing their forces for a full year.

In both north and south, the French found an operating government under Ho Chi Minh which had wide acceptance by the Vietnamese people. The Vietminh, which had been the principal anti-imperialist force, active against both the French and the Japanese, declared its independence from France on September 2, 1945, and set about to establish the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. By virtue of his wartime activities against the Japanese, Ho Chi Minh enjoyed a certain measure of popularity among the Allies; and, in the initial stages of his fight for independence, he had sympathy, if not active support, from the United States and China.

The official position of the United States vis-à-vis the struggle in Indochina came in a speech by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs in the Department of State in October, 1945, in which he stated that the United

British forces in the north and south groups in the north, and, from the beginning, the following groups followed in their footsteps in the southern front. In the north, the British forces, the assistance of the private government and assistance in the north and south groups in the north, and, from the beginning, the following groups followed in their footsteps in the southern front. In the north, the British forces, the assistance of the private government and assistance in the north and south groups in the north, and, from the beginning, the following groups followed in their footsteps in the southern front.

Great

In the north and south, the British forces in the north and south groups in the north, and, from the beginning, the following groups followed in their footsteps in the southern front. In the north, the British forces, the assistance of the private government and assistance in the north and south groups in the north, and, from the beginning, the following groups followed in their footsteps in the southern front. In the north, the British forces, the assistance of the private government and assistance in the north and south groups in the north, and, from the beginning, the following groups followed in their footsteps in the southern front. In the north, the British forces, the assistance of the private government and assistance in the north and south groups in the north, and, from the beginning, the following groups followed in their footsteps in the southern front.

Other

The British forces in the north and south groups in the north, and, from the beginning, the following groups followed in their footsteps in the southern front. In the north, the British forces, the assistance of the private government and assistance in the north and south groups in the north, and, from the beginning, the following groups followed in their footsteps in the southern front. In the north, the British forces, the assistance of the private government and assistance in the north and south groups in the north, and, from the beginning, the following groups followed in their footsteps in the southern front.

States would not intervene but would assist, if requested, in the peaceful settlement of the dispute.¹⁵ Having made this slight excursion into the arena, official Washington then lapsed into silence and total non-involvement for nearly two years.

The French had not experienced much difficulty in re-establishing hegemony, if not outright control, over Laos and Cambodia. In January, 1946, an agreement providing some autonomy to Cambodia was signed and a similar agreement for Laos was signed in August. In Vietnam, however, the line of separation was being clearly drawn. Bao Dai, having abandoned his own government in favor of the Vietminh, became the "supreme councilor" to Ho Chi Minh in September, 1945. In late 1945, the French position was, throughout Vietnam, one of weakness. Some success in driving the Vietminh from the cities in the south had been achieved, but there was no progress made in gaining popular support for a government which was based on pre-war colonialism.

In early 1946, France realized that, in the existing circumstances, a peaceful solution to the problem was important. To this end, negotiations between Ho and General Leclerc were begun in Saigon and agreement was reached on

¹⁵Address by J. C. Vincent before the Foreign Policy Association, New York, October 20, 1945, as reported in The New York Times, October 21, 1945.

March 6, 1946.¹⁶ Provided for was French recognition of the Republic of Vietnam as a free state within the French Union. The Republic was to consist of the protectorates of Annam and Tongking with the accession of Cochin China to be decided by a later plebescite. For his part, he agreed not to oppose the return of French troops to all of Vietnam for a period not to exceed five years.

The terms of the agreement were, however, subject to different interpretation by the two sides. The principal difference lay in the opposing concepts of the nature of the French Union. The French wanted a tightly-knit League, composed of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, presided over by a French High Commissioner with broad powers. The Vietminh idea was a loose federation of independent states with no supra-national official.¹⁷

In order to resolve this and other differences, Ho Chi Minh visited France in September, 1946, and reached a modus vivendi with the French in meetings at Fontainebleau. The truce was short lived, however, for the agreement encountered early opposition from the extremists of both sides. For Ho, the criticism held that the terms were too "soft" and that the French were exhibiting bad faith, particularly with

¹⁶Low, op. cit., p. 147.

¹⁷Vinacke, op. cit., p. 765.

March 1, 1946.¹⁶ The United States French Commission in the
 Republic of Vietnam as a free state. The French Union
 The Republic was as provided in the Constitution of 1946.
 and together with the Republic of Vietnam shall be
 decided by a later resolution. For the first, the second and
 to oppose the system of French Union to all of French the
 a period not at least five years.

The basis of the agreement was, however, subject to
 different interpretation by the two sides. The principal
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 French Union. The French sought a tightly-knit Union, com-
 posed of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, presided over by a
 French High Commissioner with broad powers. The Vietnamese
 had a loose conception of independent states with no
 super-national organs.¹⁷

In order to resolve this and other differences, the
 United States French Commission in September, 1946, and January 1947
agreed visually with the French in meetings at Washington.
 The French was more liberal, however, the two agreements em-
 phasized early opposition from the advocates of each side.
 For so, the Committee held that the French were the "real" and
 that the French were maintaining the "real" position with

¹⁶ ibid., pp. 141, 142.

¹⁷ ibid., pp. 141, 142.

regard to the referendum in Cochin China. The result was that Ho, either convinced by, or yielding to, the criticism, revolted against the French in December, 1946.

Outwardly, success in the struggle appeared to go to the French in 1947. The Vietminh were forced to guerrilla warfare in the countryside while the French consolidated their hold on the cities and coastal areas. Gradually, French control was expanded to include inland towns, but the rural areas remained beyond their grasp.

By mid-1947, the French recognized that no lasting solution would be possible until some of the nationalistic aspirations of the Vietnamese were realized. Still determined to ignore the communist Vietminh as a rightful government, the French began to make overtures to Bao Dai in the hopes of using him as a rallying point for Vietnamese nationalism. Bao Dai, who had wearied of his position in the Vietminh hierarchy in 1946 and had gone into exile in Hong Kong, was reluctant at first. Later, however, he gave his approval of the Provisional Central Government, which the French had established, but he did not return to Vietnam at that time.¹⁸

In an attempt to increase the popularity of the Provisional government, the French agreed to the inclusion of

¹⁸Finkelstein, op. cit., p. 12.

regard to the situation in South China. The French will not
 allow any other country to, or wishing to, be established
 outside against the French in Cambodia, 1944.

Consequently, success in the struggle against the French
 was seen in 1944. The French were forced to withdraw
 because in the countryside and the French controlled
 their hold on the cities and coastal areas. Gradually,
 French control was extended to include inland towns, and the
 French were finally forced to leave.

In 1945, the French returned to the country
 and would be established until the end of the war.
 negotiations of the Vietnamese were difficult, still under-
 stood to ignore the communist situation as a slightly govern-
 ment. The French were to have a presence in the country in the
 form of being a military force for the Vietnamese na-
 tion. The French, who had been in the position in the
 Vietnam situation in 1945 and had been in the
 camp, was returned to the French, however, he gave his
 approval of the Vietnamese (French) government, which the
 French had established. But he did not return to Vietnam at
 that time.

In an attempt to increase the popularity of the Viet-
 national government, the French agreed to the inclusion of

Cochin China in Vietnam, a concession previously denied to Ho Chi Minh. In spite of this and other concessions, however, the new government remained weak in public acceptance. This prompted the French to renew their efforts to get Bao Dai to return, and in this they had at least the tacit encouragement of the United States to whom a solution of the dispute had become important. The adversities suffered by the Chinese Nationalists had highlighted the significance of the communist influence in the Vietminh and the United States policy of aloofness toward Indochina began to disappear.

In response to assurances by the French of independence with autonomy in administrative matters (foreign and military matters were to remain in the hands of the French), Bao Dai agreed to return. He landed in Vietnam on April 28, 1949, and was proclaimed Emperor on June 14.

To the French, the return of Bao Dai and the concessions represented a strong inducement to the Vietnamese to return to the French Union. It was a characteristic of French concessions, however, that they were either too little, too late, or conditional upon some future development; this example includes some of all three.¹⁹

For the United States, there was hope, if not conviction, that this new attempt would permit the "realization of

¹⁹Low, op. cit., p. 150.

the legitimate aspirations of the Vietnamese people."²⁰ The extent of the French commitment to the struggle in Vietnam was a source of concern to the United States, whose European policy was predicated upon a strong and economically sound France. Moreover, the success of the Chinese Communists had given the situation in Indochina a special import to the United States.

The affair could no longer be ignored. What was needed was a program which ideally would be at once anti-communist and anti-colonial. Unfortunately, this seemed to call for direct intervention by the United States, and this was politically unacceptable. Material support of the French or multilateral intervention, such as by the UN, were the alternates.

Curiously, both East and West seemed to be in agreement to keep the dispute out of the UN. To the communists, bringing the problem before the UN would have meant making a choice between the desires of the French communists and those of the Vietminh. For the West, it would have meant either embarrassing France or appearing to support colonialism. In such circumstances, the struggle was best left in relative seclusion.

²⁰Department of State Bulletin, July 18, 1949, p. 75.

the legislative apparatus of the Vietnamese people.²⁰ The
 effect of the French colonialism in the country is visible
 was a factor of progress in the social field, which progress
 policy was presented upon a strong and economically sound
 basis. However, the success of the Chinese Communists has
 given rise to a situation in Indochina a serious impact on the
 United States.

The effect would be judged as follows. First, the
 needed was a program which clearly would be at once anti-
 communist and anti-colonial. Unfortunately, this seemed to
 call for direct intervention by the United States, and this
 was politically unacceptable. Instead, support of the French
 or nationalist movements, such as the CN, was the
 alternative.

Secondly, the CN and other groups seemed to be in agree-
 ment to keep the French out of the UN. On the communist
 strategy and program, which the UN would have been using a
 choice between the desire of the French communists and
 those of the Vietnamese. On the one hand, it would have meant
 either supporting France or appearing to support colonial-
 ism. On both alternatives, the struggle was lost in
 relative isolation.

²⁰ Declaration of the National Assembly, July 18, 1948, p. 24.

CHAPTER III

THE NEW ERA (1950-1954)

General

The results of the reconsideration of United States Far Eastern policies were first made public in a speech by Secretary of State Acheson on January 12, 1950.¹ Mr. Acheson began his address by stating: "I am frequently asked: Has the State Department got an Asian policy?" and proceeded to reply to the question. Although the speech was directed at Asia as a whole, there were points specifically applicable to Southeast Asia.

First was the revulsion felt by the United States against two conditions which were widespread in S-E-A-- poverty and foreign domination. Implicit in this was the desire of the United States to aid the peoples of S-E-A in raising their levels of human well-being while achieving or maintaining their freedom. The United States was interested in the peoples of Asia, not just the governments, but "the limits of what we can do are to help where we are wanted." Moreover, United States help could not accomplish the task at hand without the full and energetic cooperation of the people themselves. American assistance should be regarded

¹Department of State Bulletin, January 23, 1950, p. 111.

General

The purpose of the investigation of social conditions in the United States during the period 1912-1917 was to determine the extent to which the social conditions of the United States had improved since the publication of the report of the Social Commission in 1912. The report of the Social Commission in 1912 was based on a study of the social conditions of the United States during the period 1900-1910. The report of the Social Commission in 1912 was based on a study of the social conditions of the United States during the period 1900-1910. The report of the Social Commission in 1912 was based on a study of the social conditions of the United States during the period 1900-1910.

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¹ Report of the Social Commission, January 10, 1912

as the

missing component in a situation which might otherwise be solved. The United States cannot furnish all these components to solve the question. It cannot furnish the determination, it cannot furnish the will and it cannot furnish the loyalty of a people to its government.

Second was that United States policy was not motivated solely by anti-communism but rather by the need to prevent communist imperialism from taking "from these people what they have won and what we want them to keep and develop, which is their own national independence, their own development of their own resources for their own good"

Third was the delineation of an American defense perimeter as running from the Aleutians to Japan, the Ryukyus and the Philippines. Prophetically, this excluded Korea as well as S-E-A, but the Secretary did intimate that hostile acts outside this perimeter might provoke responsive action by the United States.

Last, it was the announced policy of the United States to seek solutions of the problems of "subversion and penetration" by other than military means.

Mr. Acheson discussed the complexities which confronted the United States in S-E-A, mentioning the difficult situation which existed in Burma and the progress which was being made in Indochina. The general conclusion to be drawn from his address was that a new day had dawned in Asia and this was recognized by the United States.

existing component is a significant factor in the
 as a result. The United States cannot afford to ignore
 component to solve the problem. It cannot afford
 the determination, to ensure that the world will be
 cannot afford the luxury of a single in the present
 world.

Second, the United States policy has not been

based solely on self-interest but rather on the basis of

extensive consultation with leading "free world" people
 what they have to say and what we have to say and hearing
 which is that our national interests, such as saving

and of which we recognize the great goal.

Third, the realization of an American dream

partnership in coming from the American to Japan, the

system and the alliance. Propositively, this includes

more as well as the fact that the Secretary has indicated that
 hostile acts outside this country which prevent relationship

action by the United States.

Fourth, it is a component policy of the United

States to take action in the presence of "subversion and
 penetration" by other than military means.

It is a policy which the United States will not

forget the United States is a free, democratic the citizens
 citizens and nations in arms and the program which was
 being made in industrial. The general conclusion to be drawn

from this document was that a new way has been found in Asia and

this was recognized by the United States.

As a policy statement, the address was a welcome indication that the United States had abandoned its policy of disinterest in Southeast Asia. In its humanistic approach, it offered to the people of Asia evidence of an understanding of their problems which had not been apparent before.

This "new look" at Asia was in consonance with an article written by Mr. Fosdick upon his return from his joint mission with Dr. Case, noted earlier. In his article,² Mr. Fosdick pointed to the need for the United States to identify itself with the "just and humane" purposes of the nationalistic movements in Asia. He envisaged the task before the United States to be ". . . to make sure, as far as we can, that the aspirations of the people of Asia for freedom and justice and more abundant living have a fair chance." In reply to those who championed military measures as the primary means of solving the problem, Mr. Fosdick said: "Arms undoubtedly have their place, but we are up against a set of ideas and ideas cannot be stopped with bombs or battleships. The only way to beat an idea is with a better idea" From the similarity of tone between the Fosdick-Case findings and Mr. Acheson's January speech,

²"Asia's Challenge To Us--Ideas, Not Guns," The New York Times, February 12, 1950.

it is probable that the latter was based, in large measure, upon the former.

The remainder of the first half of 1950 was replete with evidence that, having gotten underway at last, United States policy for Southeast Asia was proceeding apace. At least, public pronouncements so indicated. Secretary Acheson announced that the United States had extended to Emperor Bao Dai "the hope that closer relationship will be established between Vietnam and the United States."³ Ambassador Jessup's Bangkok conference of ambassadors ended February 15, reporting that it had discussed the assistance which could support the national aspirations of the peoples of Southeast Asia.⁴ On February 23, announcement was made of a mission to Southeast Asia, headed by R. Allan Griffin, which would survey the situation in terms of what aid could be given. There was obvious interest in the area and on a scale difficult to imagine a year previous.

On March 15, Secretary Acheson iterated the broad concepts of his January 12th speech but expanded them to include the extension of the Truman Doctrine to Southeast

³Department of State Bulletin, February 13, 1950, p. 244.

⁴Ibid., March 27, 1950, p. 502.

It is possible that the letter was dated, at least possibly,

about the same time.

The content of the letter will be read and remains
with evidence that, having been written at least dated
before being the document, it is possible that it

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Asia.⁵ It was an important addition to United States policy.

In April, John Foster Dulles was appointed as Special Consultant to Secretary Acheson with the primary assignment of negotiating a peace treaty with Japan and returning her to a position of respectability in the family of nations. The appointment was significant in that it presaged the beginning of the reconstruction of Japan and a continuing association of Mr. Dulles with Southeast Asia.

There was growing concern over the possibility that Southeast Asia would be further attracted toward communism in view of developments in China. An example of successful "nationalism" there was much in China to influence the nationalist movements in Southeast Asia. The extent of this concern was apparent when Asian problems were the first order of business at the Foreign Ministers Meeting in London on May 16⁶ and at conferences in Paris before the meeting.⁷

The Griffin Mission completed its survey in May and recommended that \$60,000,000 in economic aid be made

⁵Speech before the Commonwealth Club, San Francisco, March 15, 1950, as reported in Department of State Bulletin, March 27, 1950, p. 500.

⁶Department of State Bulletin, May 29, 1950, p. 328.

⁷The New York Times, May 9, 1950.

available to Southeast Asia. The proposed distribution of this amount was announced promptly by Acting Secretary of State Webb, together with plans for an additional \$75,000,000 in military aid for the areas.⁸

This long-over-due involvement in the problems of Southeast Asia was to be brought into sharp focus shortly. In June, 1950, the Korean War gave priority in United States policies to Asian affairs in general, but nearly all were viewed in the context of their effect upon the war. The aid programs, begun only months before, were continued for they were in direct support of anti-communism. The contributions of Southeast Asian nations to the United Nations force in Korea were welcomed albeit much more for their symbolism than for their military value. A new mission to survey the Southeast Asia in terms of military aid requirements commenced its tour on July 5 and visited all countries in the area except Burma. Headed by John Melby, the Mission was to make recommendations concerning arms shipments and the composition of United States Advisory Groups.⁹ In essence, Korea did not invalidate the new policies announced at the beginning of the year, but it did add a sense of realism to them.

Within the Congress, 1950 had been a year of partisan

⁸Ibid., May 12, 1950.

⁹Ibid., July 6, 1950.

available to Government. The proposed distribution of
 this amount was announced previously by Acting Secretary of
 State Webb, together with plans for an additional \$75,000,000
 in military aid for the same.⁵

This long-overdue investment in the defense of
 Southeast Asia was to be brought into sharp focus shortly.
 In June, 1955, the House and Senate authorized in House Report
 1010 and Senate Report 1010, respectively, the transfer of
 \$100,000,000 to the Military Aid to Vietnam Fund. The aid
 provided, under only minor changes, was designed for the
 year in which it was authorized. The distribution
 of the fund was to be made to the United States Army in
 1955 and the remainder of the fund was to be spent
 over the next military year. A new device to ensure the
 Government's aid in terms of military aid was established and
 named the fund in July, 1955 and revised all conditions in the
 fund were made. Under the new plan, the fund was to be
 used for military aid, including all other aid, for the year
 and recommended conditions were approved and the condi-
 tions of United States military aid.⁶ In August, 1955,
 the act authorized the new military aid program at the same
 time as the year, but it was not a year in which the fund
 (which was authorized) 1955 and 1956 a year in which

⁵ 1955-56, July 1, 1955.
⁶ 1955-56, July 1, 1955.

criticism--and defense--of Far East policies. Most of the comments concerned China or, after June, Korea. Southeast Asia was mentioned principally in terms of the aid being offered or in support of the thesis that the loss of China to communism was a criminal blunder. The only bi-partisan effort of note was a proposal by Senators Morse (R) and Pepper (D) to place the Indochina dispute before the United Nations inasmuch as there was danger in continuing to support France without others joining in.¹⁰ Aside from this isolated instance, the Congress was divided along political lines; it was the time of McCarthy, and it was an election year.

The Eighty-second Congress convened to pick up discussion of the United States Far East policy where the Eighty-first Congress had left it. As might be imagined, the main concern in Asia was centered about Korea, but Southeast Asia did receive both thought and comment. Fortunately, it was far more bi-partisan in character than had been the case in the preceding year.

On January 5, 1951, Senator Taft spoke concerning the use of United States forces in Southeast Asia and opposed the use of any ground forces.¹¹ Ten days later, Senator

¹⁰Congressional Record, 81st Congress, 2d Session (Washington: Government Printing Office), p. 17000.

¹¹Ibid., p. 56.

Douglas said that the United States could protect Southeast Asia as well as Europe and that ground forces would not be necessary; the job could be done by our superior sea and air forces. The sense--and import--of Senator Douglas' speech was that Southeast Asia, particularly the area of Indochina, Burma, and Thailand, was strategically important to us and should not be neglected as we looked so closely at Europe's problems.¹²

There were, however, less constructive or responsible discussions which kept the United States on the defensive, domestically, concerning Asian policies. Senator Jenner, on September 24, 1951, spoke at length in the Senate, reviewing United States policies in the Far East. He broadened the McCarthy charges to include the alleged treasonable conduct of General Marshall, and he stated that the United States had two policies for Asia: the first that of the President, the State Department, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the second that of MacArthur, the fighting men, and the American people.¹³ Aimed primarily at China and Korea, the speech contributed to the ill-repute of all United States foreign affairs, particularly within the country itself. There was growing opinion that, as Senator Ferguson expressed it after

¹²Ibid., p. 245.

¹³Ibid., p. 11946.

his Far East tour, the United States was taking a "beating" in Southeast Asia.¹⁴

In the matter of aid, the United States made positive progress in 1951. First was the Mutual Security Act of 1951 which, inter alia, improved the administrative procedures for distributing funds and established certain criteria which need be met in order to receive aid. In Southeast Asia, the United States associated itself with the Colombo Plan in recognition of the pressing need for economic improvement throughout the area. Military aid in increasing amounts was being provided, the largest portion going to Indochina.

During the major part of 1952, foreign affairs were much discussed. The Presidential and Congressional elections were fought in large part around questions of foreign relations with particular attention being given to the problems of the Far East. The Truman Administration's handling of Asian affairs was the prime target of the Republicans attack. Republican candidates called loudly for a new "dynamic policy," promising, if elected, the "roll back" of communist power.¹⁵ This new and vigorous policy was, moreover, to be accompanied by reducing both the budget and the involvement

¹⁴Ibid., p. 3358.

¹⁵D. B. Goebel (ed.), American Foreign Policy--A Documentary Survey 1776-1960 (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1961), p. 391.

his last year, the United States was taking a "leading

in world affairs."

In the matter of the United States' policy

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of United States military forces in Asia. In essence, "if there must be war there, let it be 'Asians against Asians.'"¹⁶

While internal politics dominated the year, United States policy for Southeast Asia did undergo a slight but significant change when the United States joined with the United Kingdom and France in issuing a warning in the United Nations concerning Chinese Communist aggression in Southeast Asia. Such aggression would "be a matter of direct and grave concern which would require the most urgent and earnest consideration by the United Nations."¹⁷ This represented a marked departure from the previous policy of keeping the Indochina question outside the United Nations.

In the Congress, suggestions of substance were few as campaign utterances replaced objective discussions of foreign policies. Senator Smith did make a tour of the Far East for the Committee on Foreign Relations, but Southeast Asia was not included in the itinerary.

The Eisenhower Administration's policy toward Southeast Asia did not differ significantly from that of the

¹⁶Eisenhower speech, as reported in The New York Times, October 3, 1952.

¹⁷As quoted in M. S. Farley, United States Relations with Southeast Asia (New York: American Institute of Pacific Relations, 1955), p. 5.

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Table 1. Mean values of the variables measured in the 1000 subjects.

10. Police receiving 911 calls are required to respond to a building

Truman Administration insofar as it applied to Southeast Asia. There was new enthusiasm for foreign affairs, and the war in Korea was stopped but the broad guide lines remained unchanged. As the truce negotiations in Korea progressed, concern over Chinese intentions in Southeast Asia heightened and, increasingly, public statements were directed toward the Southeast Asia situation. When the armistice was signed, the sixteen members of the United Nations who had fought in Korea issued a faint warning to Communist China.¹⁸ President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles emphasized the importance the United States attached to Southeast Asia and Mr. Dulles, in a speech before the American Legion stated that Chinese aggression "could not occur without grave consequence which might not be confined to Indochina."¹⁹

This doctrine of "Massive Retaliation" was the implementation of the Republican campaign promises to reduce expenditures while increasing strength. However, since it represented a policy of making any local situation one of global importance, it aroused some apprehension among friends; apprehension that continued for some years, but it was not all bad.²⁰

¹⁸The New York Times, August 8, 1953.

¹⁹Ibid., September 5, 1953.

²⁰O. E. Clubb, The U.S. and the Sino-Soviet Bloc in

Chinese government's position as it relates to the
 fact. There was no question for Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the
 rest of those who stopped but the broad view of the
 situation. As the other perspective is more important,
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 the stated position of the United States and the Soviet
 Union is a fact which is not only a fact, but
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 intervention of the Soviet Union, was not only a fact,
 intervention with increasing interest. However, there is
 represented a policy of waiting and seeing, and it
 global situation, it shows some uncertainty about
 future. Intervention that continued the fact, but it
 was not a fact.¹⁰

¹⁰ The New York Times, August 2, 1955.

¹¹ Ibid., September 2, 1955.

¹² Ibid., p. 10. The fact is that the situation is

The aid programs for the countries of Southeast Asia were progressing in exemplary fashion. Expenditures for technical and economic aid were necessarily spread over a span of years, but the military aid program was concentrated so that expenditures equaled appropriations in each fiscal year. Secretary Dulles, in his press conference on May 9, 1953, spoke with enthusiasm concerning United States aid for the countries of that area and cited two examples of where requests for emergency aid were met within twenty-four hours.²¹

Aside from the aid programs, however, there was little from which to gain comfort. The situation throughout Southeast Asia was not reassuring insofar as gaining the offensive against communism was concerned. This was especially so in Indochina.

The period 1950-1954 had seen the United States attitude change from aloofness to keen interest. We had come to

Southeast Asia (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1962), p. 17. Clubb credits the policy with aiding in ending the war in Indochina. According to his thesis, the Soviets were wary of letting the war in Indochina go on in view of United States determination to use massive retaliation and the Soviet commitment to China.

²¹The New York Times, May 10, 1953. The examples were an airlift for Laotian defense forces and ammunition for Thailand.

realize that ". . . it is the security, even the survival, of the free world that is threatened in Asia."²²

Thailand

In early 1950, Thailand's government abandoned its policy of pro-Western neutrality and openly aligned itself with the West in the cold war. It was the final step of a program begun in 1945 and a welcome climax for United States efforts throughout the preceding five years. As a reward for a courtship which had little justification in the beginning, it was appropriate. Insofar as its near-term benefits to Thailand were concerned, however, it was disappointing.

As in other Southeast Asia countries, the United States had two missions in Thailand in 1950: the first, the Griffin mission, surveying the requirements for economic and technical aid; the second, the Melby mission, concerned with military aid. Both missions recommended the allocation of aid in amounts comparable to that programmed for Burma and Indonesia.

That the United States was partial to Thailand and prone to accept or overlook a great deal was evident in its attitude from 1945 on. As the Director of the Office of

²²United States Congress, House, Report 2025 on Special Study Mission to Southeast Asia, 83rd Congress, 2d Session, July 2, 1954.

Philippines and Southeast Asian Affairs remarked, the United States blamed the Japanese occupation for the present political weakness of Thailand.²³

The agreements to provide economic and military aid were signed on September 19, 1950, and October 17, 1950, respectively. Such was the reputation of the Thailand-United States relationship that United States Ambassador Stanton felt constrained to point out that the agreement was neither a defense pact nor a United States request for bases; it was merely an agreement in response to a Thailand request for help in order to strengthen its defenses and economy.²⁴

Thailand's response to the United Nations resolution concerning Korea was to send four thousand troops and a small naval contingent to join the United Nations forces. This gesture of support was particularly encouraging and welcome in view of its propaganda value. Full logistic support for the forces was provided by the United States.²⁵

²³W. S. B. Lacy, Director of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs, in an address at Institute of Public Affairs, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia, July 11, 1950, as reported in Vital Speeches, September 1, 1950, p. 689.

²⁴Department of State Bulletin, October 30, 1950, p. 702.

²⁵In the summer of 1951, a Thailand PC ran aground off Korea and was destroyed. It was promptly replaced by the United States.

Philippines and Southeast Asian Affairs Commission, the United States placed the Japanese occupation for the present political situation of Thailand.¹¹

The agreement to provide economic and military aid were signed on September 11, 1941, and October 11, 1941. Subsequently, there was the negotiation of the Thailand-United States Friendship and Consular Rights Agreement. This agreement was signed and contained no clause but that the agreement was not a defense of the United States against for Japan. It was merely an agreement in response to a Thai request for help in order to strengthen the defense and economy.¹² Thailand's response to the United Nations resolution concerning Korea was to send two thousand troops and a well-armed contingent to join the United Nations forces. This gesture of support was particularly encouraging and welcome in view of the propaganda value. Full political support for the forces was granted by the United States.¹³

¹¹ G. B. Ladd, Director of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs, in an address at Institute of Public Affairs, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia, July 11, 1950, as reported in Vital Speeches, December 1, 1950, p. 433.

¹² Agreement of Trade Relations, October 10, 1940, p. 101.

¹³ In the summer of 1941, a Thai 100 ton aircraft carrier was destroyed. It was promptly replaced by the United States.

Thailand also voted for the February 1, 1951, resolution which branded Communist China an aggressor in Korea.

In 1950, there were two notable weaknesses in the Thailand government: internal instability as a result of economic problems and political dictatorship. Economic aid assisted in removing the first from the acute category, but the second continued to thrive through 1954. The "Free Thailand Movement," headed by former Premier Pridi and based in China, was a constant irritant whose allegations were difficult to deny in their entirety.

As the Vietminh gained in Indochina, the seriousness of Thailand's position increased. Not only might she be subject to overt invasion, but the possibility of subversion was greatly increased. In these circumstances, Thailand moved even closer to the United States.

In the case of the nationalist Chinese soldiers in Burma, Thailand supported the United States efforts and provided the staging area for the evacuation of those who did return to Taiwan. There was no occasion in 1953 and 1954 when Thailand did not publicly side with the United States and cooperate to the fullest extent possible. Having decided that a policy of even quasi-neutrality was no longer prudent, Thailand turned wholeheartedly to a pro-United States policy.

As the crisis in Indochina deepened, United States

Thailand also voted for the February 2, 1955, resolution

which called Communist China an aggressor in Korea.

In 1950, there were two sizable weaknesses in the

Thailand government's internal stability as a result of

economic problems and political dissension. Economic aid

stopped in coming for lack from the same category, and

the second continued to drive through 1951. The "type

Thailand Movement," however, by former Premier Pridi and others

in China, was a movement against which discussion was

difficult to deny its real reality.

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decided that a policy of non-partisanship was no longer

practical. Thailand turned wholeheartedly to a pro-United

States policy.

At the same time in Indonesia developed, United States

activities in Thailand became more and more those which were in support of the struggle to the north. In a press conference, Secretary Dulles urged United Nations support in case of communist invasion of Thailand,²⁶ an invasion which would come from Indochina. By December, 1953, the United States did not consider the threat of invasion by the Viet-minh to be significant²⁷ although, within a month, the availability of United States protection in the event of communist attack was reaffirmed.²⁸

As the threat grew, so did United States aid, particularly military assistance. In fiscal year 1951, expenditures for military aid were \$4.5 million; in fiscal year 1962, \$12 million; in fiscal year 1953, \$55.8 million; and in fiscal year 1954, \$38.9 million.²⁹ This build-up of military strength was supervised by an aid mission which in 1954 numbered about three hundred personnel.³⁰ In late 1954, Thailand's commitment to the West was made even more firm by

²⁶The New York Times, May 8, 1953.

²⁷Ibid., December 30, 1953.

²⁸Ambassador Donovan as reported in The New York Times, January 26, 1954.

²⁹Report of United States Foreign Assistance Program, United States Agency for International Development, Washington, 1962.

³⁰Farley, op. cit., p. 46.

activities in Thailand became more and more active which were in support of the struggle to the north. In a speech on January, 1954, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek stated support in case of Communist invasion of Thailand.²⁶ In a speech which would come from Indochina, 27 December, 1953, the United States did not consider the threat of invasion by the Viet-Nam to be significant.²⁷ Although, within a month, the availability of United States protection in the event of Communist attack was reaffirmed.²⁸

As the threat grew, so did United States aid, particularly military assistance. In fiscal year 1951, expenditures for military aid were 14.5 million; in fiscal year 1952, 112 million; in fiscal year 1953, 135.8 million; and in fiscal year 1954, 138.8 million.²⁹ This outlay of military strength was supervised by an aid mission which in 1954 numbered about three hundred personnel.³⁰ In late 1954, Thailand's commitment to the war was made even more firm by

²⁶The New York Times, May 12, 1953.

²⁷Ibid., December 30, 1953.

²⁸Ambassador Donovan as reported in The New York Times, January 26, 1954.

²⁹Report of United States Foreign Assistance Program, United States Agency for International Development, Washington, 1954.

³⁰Ibid., pp. 411, 4-12.

her adherence to SEATO. As one of three Asian members and as the only one located in continental Southeast Asia, her importance to the organization was large, both strategically and psychologically. Her enthusiastic participation in SEATO has not been exceeded by any other member; first to ratify the treaty, home of the headquarters, and provider of the Secretary General.

In Thailand, the United States encountered a unique attitude of pro-Westernism--one that differed both in scope and enthusiasm from that of any other Southeast Asia nation with the possible exception of the Philippines. In return for a commitment to support and protect Thailand, the United States has gained a valued ally. Whatever the policies which produced this result--and they are difficult to correlate with our other Southeast Asian policies--they were proved to be prudent.

Burma

By mid-1950 the internal unrest that had plagued Burma since her independence began to ease. The Kasen tribes had ceased to dominate the lower part of the country and the communists had contributed to their own weakness by intra-party conflict. The Burmese government established enough internal control that it could, with safety, look externally.

not adhered to. The use of Chinese-Asian workers and
 at the only one located in continental Southeast Asia, but
 importance to the organization was large, both strategically
 and psychologically. The organizational position in
 1949 has not been extended by any other member; there is
 really no likely, none of the headquarters, and provided of
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In 1949, the United States encountered a unique
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Summary

By mid-1950 the internal unrest that had plagued
 since since the independence began to ease. The Korean
 crisis had ceased to dominate the lower part of the country
 and the communists had continued to their own interests by
 intra-party conflict. The southern government established
 enough internal control that it could, with safety, look
 externally.

The neutralism that Burma had adopted caused an ambivalence toward United States aid programs once they began to reach Southeast Asia. In the spring of 1950, the Griffin mission recommended that economic and technical assistance be given Burma,³¹ and on September 13, 1950, an agreement to this effect was signed by Burma and the United States. As concerned military aid, however, the attitude of the Burmese was different.

In the summer, another mission, under John Melby, with the task of smoothing the way for military aid in Southeast Asia, met with less success. The Minister of Defense would not receive the mission, and the visit was, therefore, cancelled.³² Accordingly, no official program of military assistance between the two nations was established although it is reported that some such assistance was provided.³³

The economic and technical aid was directed into programs concerned with health, transportation, agriculture, and industry. From 1950-1954, about \$20,000,000 was expended and in roughly equal amounts for each category. Even when the aid program was terminated in 1953 at the request

³¹The New York Times, April 3, 1950.

³²Ibid., September 7, 1950.

³³Finkelstein, op. cit., p. 46.

was different.

Domestic military aid, however, the provision of the Mutual
Defense Assistance Control Act signed by United States and the United States, as
no given money, and on September 11, 1950, an agreement to
mission recommended that economic and technical assistance
to repair equipment. In the spring of 1950, the United States
agreed to provide military aid and equipment under the Mutual
Defense Assistance Control Act which had adopted passed in 1949.

known it is reported that some sort assistance was provided
military assistance occurred the two nations was established
exchange, cancelled.¹² Interestingly, an official program of
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with the fact of something that was military aid to
to the summit, Charles Wilson, Major John Wiley,

The economic and technical aid was discussed with the
the committee with respect to the economic aid.
and industry. The 1960-1961 report \$10,000,000 was ex-
pected and is roughly equal amounts for each category. Over
the last year was increased to 1961 at the rate of

of the Burmese government,³⁴ some United States technicians stayed on in the employ of Burma.

If the framework of Burma's foreign policy was neutralism and non-alignment, the chosen instrument for carrying out the policy was the United Nations. From the beginning, Burma was an active participant in United Nations deliberations and affairs. Only in her consideration of situations involving Communist China did Burma vary from adherence to neutralist principles. In June, 1950, Burma supported the United Nations resolution which condemned North Korea as an aggressor, yet in February 1951, she voted against an Assembly Resolution which classed China as an aggressor.

Relationships between Burma and the United States in the period under discussion were conducted in an atmosphere relatively free from major discord. One minor incident concerned the arrest and conviction of Dr. Gordon Seagrave for assisting the Karen tribes in their rebellion against the government. Dr. Seagrave was well known to, and admired by, Americans and his trial aroused concern for his well-being. The problem disappeared, however, with no ill feelings on either side when his appeal resulted in his release.

A more serious problem, and one demanding more

³⁴The New York Times, March 29, 1953.

of the Chinese government,¹ and United States technicians
 stayed on in the camp of Japan.
 It is noteworthy that the United States policy was
 limited and non-alignment, the United States was
 carrying out the policy was the United States, from the
 beginning, there was an active participant in United Nations
 deliberations and efforts, and in the consideration of
 situations involving Communist China and other very low
 attention to international principles. In June, 1950, the
 supported the United Nations resolution which demanded
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 aggressor.
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 the period under discussion was conducted in an atmosphere
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 sidered the threat and cooperation of the United Nations for
 assisting the United States in their position against the
 government. Dr. Zengren was well known to, and assisted by,
 Americans and his wife moved around for his well-being.
 The problem disappeared, however, with the 111 days on
 which side when his report resulted in his release.
 A new nation problem, and the situation was

diplomatic activity, was the incident of the Chinese Nationalist soldiers in Burma. With the collapse of the Nationalist army in 1950, a small group (estimated 1-2000) of Chinese soldiers in Yunnan Province fled before the communists and crossed the border into Burma. Living freely off the land and enjoying freedom of movement to raid Communist China, these soldiers constituted a major source of embarrassment to Burma. In the first place, they continued to grow in number and thus further contravened Burmese sovereignty over the area; and in the second place, they presented a growing provocation to Communist China. In early 1953, Burma estimated the number of troops had grown to 12,000.

The Chinese communist had charged that these troops received supplies from the United States and that they constituted an invasion force. The United States denied the charge of supplying the force and was partly successful in convincing Burma of the inaccuracy of the Chinese allegation. The matter had become critical in the eyes of the Burmese, however; and in March 1953, Burma took the issue to the United Nations, charging the Nationalist Chinese government with aggression.³⁵ Coincident with this development, Burma terminated the United States aid program.³⁶

³⁵The New York Times, March 27, 1953.

³⁶According to Farley, the termination resulted from Burmese domestic pressure rather than from anger at the United States, op. cit., p. 42.

discontinued activity was the incident of the Chinese Revolution in 1911. After the collapse of the Nationalist Government in 1911, a small group (estimated 1-5000) of Chinese soldiers in Soviet provinces fled before the communists and crossed the border into Soviet Russia. Living freely at the first and enjoying freedom of movement for this Communist China, these soldiers constituted a major source of military assistance to Russia. In the first place, they continued to give to Russia and China military equipment, Soviet supplies, and in the second place, they organized a special organization for Chinese troops in early 1922. Some estimated the number of troops at 15,000. The Chinese Government was shocked that these troops received supplies from the Soviet Union and that they were allowed an invasion force. The United States learned the danger of supplying the forces and was partly successful in convincing Russia of the insincerity of the Chinese situation. The matter had become critical in the eyes of the Chinese, however, but in 1923, some from the issue to the United Nations, urging the Nationalist Chinese Government with aggression.¹² Coinciding with this development, some estimated the United States aid program.¹³

¹²The New York Times, March 29, 1923.

¹³According to history, the commission received from Russia detailed financial reports from 1921 to the United States, pp. 41-4, p. 42.

The discussion before the United Nations was a source of embarrassment to the United States and, in an attempt to cut it short, the United States sought to settle the dispute between Burma and Nationalist China.³⁷ The discussion continued, however, and the United Nations Assembly adopted a resolution calling upon the soldiers to leave Burma and for United Nations members to refrain from assisting them.

The dispute was not so easily disposed of in practice as it was on paper. Many of the Chinese refused repatriation; and for those who would leave Burma, transportation was a problem. By mid-1954, Burma announced that some four thousand troops still remained.³⁸ By November, 1953, however, ill feeling toward the United States over this situation had eased as a result of American efforts to assist in evacuating the Chinese, and relationships returned to normal.

The attitude the United States had toward neutralists in the early days of the Eisenhower Administration was one of trying to prevent them from being drawn into the communist sphere by giving aid in small amounts. In the case of Burma this was a difficult policy to pursue inasmuch as even token aid was unacceptable. Therefore, a request to provide some aid, albeit indirect, was welcomed.

³⁷The New York Times, April 8, 1953.

³⁸Ibid., August 21, 1954.

The discussion before the United Nations was a source of embarrassment to the United States and, in an attempt to put it behind, the United States agreed to settle the dispute between Korea and Rastafarianism. The discussion was, however, and the United Nations Assembly adopted a resolution calling upon the subjects to leave Korea and the United Nations members to refrain from assisting them. The clause was not as easily disposed of in practice as it was on paper. Many of the Chinese refused registration and for those who would leave Korea, registration was a problem. By mid-1953, Korea announced that those who remained there still remained.²⁶ By November, 1953, however, the feeling toward the United States over this situation had eased as a result of American efforts to assist in reuniting the Chinese, and relationships returned to normal. The action the United States had toward Rastafarianism in the early days of the Eisenhower Administration was one of trying to prevent them from being known for the common- sense approach by giving aid in small amounts. In the case of Korea this was a diplomatic policy to prevent Rastafarianism as even Korea was uncooperative. Therefore, a request to provide some aid, albeit limited, was followed.

²⁷ The New York Times, April 6, 1953.

²⁸ Id., August 21, 1954.

In October, 1954, Burma asked the United States to buy rice with dollars and allocate the grain to needy Southeast Asian countries; Burma would spend the dollars for United States technical aid and equipment.³⁹ Because of the opportunity to provide aid to Burma again, as well as for the humanitarian implications, the United States complied with the request.⁴⁰

The United States did not significantly advance nor impair its image in Southeast Asia by its policies or actions in Burma. Insofar as their net effect upon other countries in the area, they constituted a holding operation with neither gain nor loss involved; insofar as Burma was concerned, they neither attracted nor repelled.

Indochina

It was in Indochina that the United States policies received their most severe trial--and were found most wanting.

The beginning of 1950 found the French implementing an earlier agreement by ceding to Bao Dai some autonomy in domestic matters. While the powers granted were not extensive, the concession was important as an indication of

³⁹The New York Times, October 15, 1954.

⁴⁰This program terminated in 1957 when direct economic and technical aid to Burma was resumed.

In December, 1954, however, the United States to
 day also with delivery and otherwise the grain is nearly double-
 cost than in 1954; which would mean the United States
 United States technical aid and equipment.¹⁹ Because of the
 opportunity to provide aid to Russia again, as well as the
 for humanitarian implications, the United States complied
 with the request.²⁰

The United States did not significantly advance not
 to the issue in 1954. In 1954, the policy of 1954-
 1955 in Russia. In 1954, as there was still upon other
 countries in the West, they continued a holding operation
 with national gain and loss involved; in 1954, as Russia was
 concerned, they neither retreated nor repelled.

Conclusion

It was in 1954 that the United States policy
 received their most severe test—and were found most want-
 ing.

The beginning of 1955 found the French implementing
 an earlier agreement by ending its aid to some autonomy in
 domestic affairs. While the Soviet Union was not satis-
 fied, the concession was important as an indication of

¹⁹The New York Times, October 15, 1954.

²⁰This program terminated in 1957 when direct economic
 and technical aid to Russia was resumed.

intent and warranted congratulations from Ambassador Jessup who was in Saigon at the time. On January 28, 1950, the French Assembly ratified the Elysee Agreement,⁴¹ signed the preceding March, and so created the independent states of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos--all within the French Union. The United States recognized the three states on February 7, 1950.⁴²

The diplomatic corollary to this was the Peking recognition of the Vietminh in January, 1950. The Soviets extended recognition soon afterward--a development which Secretary Acheson said came as a surprise.⁴³ The sides in Indochina were now clearly drawn and the framework for an open East-West confrontation had been established. That the situation had escalated from a colonial rebellion to a war of global implications made little difference to the French except that it opened the door for United States aid.

An aid program specifically aimed at the needs in Indochina was forthcoming shortly. While Marshall Plan aid had been given to France in 1949, the United States had not been enthusiastic about having such aid re-directed to

⁴¹The New York Times, January 29, 1950.

⁴²Department of State Bulletin, February 20, 1950, p. 291.

⁴³Ibid., February 13, 1950, p. 244.

Indochina. To the United States, the need for building up Europe militarily as well as economically, and the desire to avoid being involved in Southeast Asia, were sufficient reasons to disapprove of the transfer of aid materials by France.

In March, 1950, Ambassador Jessup returned from his visit to the Far East and the conference with American Ambassadors in Southeast Asia. He spoke in favor of aid for Indochina, both military and economic, as well as technical assistance. This recommendation, coming shortly after Secretary Acheson's extension of the Truman Doctrine to Southeast Asia, reflected the growing consideration being given to the concept. On May 8 in Paris, Secretary Acheson announced that economic aid and military equipment would be provided by the United States. Specifically, the aid would be given to the "Associated States of Indochina and to France in order to assist them in restoring stability and permitting these states to pursue their peaceful and democratic development."⁴⁴ By making the aid available in the names of the three countries as well as France, the United States sought to forestall any charge of supporting colonialism.

The Conference of Foreign Ministers, meeting in London, reaffirmed the existence of the interests of Britain

⁴⁴The New York Times, May 9, 1950.

and France in Malaya and Indochina, respectively, and agreed upon the need to combat communism in Southeast Asia as well as in Europe. While the practical value of this declaration was slight, it did serve to mitigate criticism which contended that the United States was alone in its efforts.

Having recognized Bao Dai, the United States proceeded to reassure itself, and others, that this was the correct thing to do. In a speech in New Dehli, Ambassador Henderson said:

The United States is convinced that the Bao Dai government of Vietnam reflects more accurately than any rival claimants to power in Vietnam the national aspirations of the people of that country.⁴⁵

In July, W. S. B. Lacy, Director of the Office of Phillipine and Southeast Asia Affairs, spoke of the need to strengthen Bao Dai both militarily and politically in order that the Nationalist Movement in Vietnam could succeed.⁴⁶

The North Korean attack on June 25, 1950, had a distinct effect upon United States activities in Indochina. What had been an evolutionary change became, in the urgency of the situation, more revolutionary in pacing. Military considerations became paramount not only in Korea but in all

⁴⁵Before Indian Council of World Affairs, New Dehli, March 27, 1950, as reported in Vital Speeches, May 15, 1950, p. 460.

⁴⁶Before Institute of Public Affairs, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, July 11, 1950, as reported in Vital Speeches, September 1, 1950, p. 689.

areas where United States interest was active. Military aid took priority over economic or technical assistance and, despite the heavy requirements of United States forces in Korea, arms began to arrive in Saigon in August.⁴⁷ By October, the flow of military aid was uninterrupted and growing. During fiscal year 1951, expenditures totaled \$104.3 million in military aid and \$3.3 million in economic aid.

Toward the end of 1950, the French assigned General de Lattre de Tassigny as Commander of French forces in Indochina. His arrival, plus the receipt of increased military aid, marked the beginning of a lively but short demonstration of superior military power. Vietminh attacks were soundly defeated and control was strengthened over coastal areas and cities. Moreover, the nucleus of a Vietnamese national army was formed and recruiting and training begun.

In January, 1951, President Truman and Premier Plevin met in Washington to discuss, inter alia, United States aid to France for Indochina. The conference resulted in an agreement by the United States to increase both the quantity and the timing of military aid,⁴⁸ an agreement that was to be repeated often in the future.

⁴⁷The New York Times, August 11, 1950.

⁴⁸Ibid., January 25, 1951.

The United States Minister to Vietnam, in a television address on February 10, 1951, spoke of the aid being received and of its beneficial effect upon the situation. He emphasized the need to realize that Ho Chi Minh and the Vietminh were examples of communism and not nationalism.⁴⁹ Within the Congress, there were differing views as to the intent and effect of United States aid to Indochina. Senator Malone, on April 9, 1951, contended it was financing the maintenance of colonial slavery in Indochina;⁵⁰ Senator Connally, on August 29, 1951, said the aid not only helped stop communism in Indochina but also helped Europe by releasing French troops in Indochina for return to France.

General de Lattre de Tassigny arrived in Washington for a conference with United States officials concerning the military aid program. The overall result of the conference was agreement that more aid was needed and would be forthcoming.⁵¹ While in Washington, the General spoke to the National Press Club and denied that the war in Indochina could be accurately called a colonial war since Indochina was no longer a colony.⁵²

⁴⁹Text as reprinted in Congressional Record, 82d Congress, 1st Session, p. A741.

⁵⁰Ibid., p. 3524.

⁵¹The New York Times, September 23, 1951.

⁵²National Press Club, Washington, September 20, 1951, as reported in Vital Speeches, October 15, 1951, p. 21.

Throughout 1951, French success in Indochina had been heartening if not decisive. For the first time since 1946, the Vietminh were being met with an effective defense and the initiative was not always theirs. In early 1952, as the election campaign began to become prominent, the eventual success of the French and Vietnamese in Indochina--with United States aid, of course--appeared to be the consensus in the United States. Senator Taft spoke in favor of continued aid but no United States troops.⁵³ General Eisenhower iterated this position in a press conference in April.⁵⁴ While preoccupation with Korea contributed to the lack of concern for Indochina, the improved situation there was also encouraging.

The requirements for United States aid were, however, growing more rapidly than were the authorizations. In February and again in April, the French requested an increase in amount and a speeding up of the pipe line. Both requests were agreed to and aid expenditure for fiscal year 1952 totaled \$162.5 million, up some \$55 million over fiscal year 1951. The majority of the agreed-to increases were, however, not delivered until fiscal years 1953 and 1954

⁵³The New York Times, January 20, 1952.

⁵⁴Ibid., April 8, 1952.

when expenditures were, respectively, \$388.9 million and \$538.6 million.⁵⁵

With the election oratory finished, there was little public discussion of Southeast Asia during the last two months of the year. Senator Smith, on a tour of the area, spoke concerning possible United States reaction to communist aggression in Indochina. He considered that the United States should make clear its intention to invoke sanctions (i.e., blockade) and to use United States air and naval forces--but not troops--to oppose any such aggression.⁵⁶

One further step was accomplished which indicated at least a token move toward united effort in Indochina. At the NATO council meeting in Paris in December, the Council, for the first time, acknowledged that a link existed between the Asian and European strategies of the allies vis-à-vis the communists and pledged support to the French in Indochina.⁵⁷

The Eisenhower Administration, from the beginning, undertook to expedite and increase the aid to Indochina, and

⁵⁵U.S. Agency for International Development, Report of United States Foreign Assistance Programs, Washington, 1962.

⁵⁶Congressional Record, 82d Congress, 2d Session, pp. 572-573.

⁵⁷The New York Times, December 18, 1952.

[illegible]

the early months of the year saw a conference with the French in Washington to this effect.

In Indochina, the French commander, General Navarre, proposed a plan for the expansion of the role played by the Vietnamese in the war. Named the Navarre Plan, it called for the creation and training of all-native forces to assume the responsibility for rear areas by taking over administrative and garrison duties. The French forces replaced would then be available for combat duties. Implicit in the plan was an increase in the amount of material being furnished under United States aid program. The pace of the war against the Vietminh was to be increased.

The need for some increase in numerical strength from a source other than France had been apparent for some months. By the end of 1952, one-third of all French forces were engaged in Indochina, and the cost to France was \$1 billion per year. Increase beyond this was not to be expected from a country that was already thoroughly weary of the sacrifices involved.

As the chances of achieving an armistice in Korea increased, so did apprehension over the possibility of Chinese intervention in Indochina. The success of the Chinese armies in Korea and the prestige gained therefrom, the availability of large numbers of combat-trained troops and amounts of war materials, and the possibility that the

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Vietminh might be getting the worst of it, all pointed toward outright Chinese interference and prompted the joint United States-French statement that any aggression would have "serious consequences."⁵⁸ Subsequent statements, both unilateral and joint, indicated the seriousness with which intervention would be regarded.⁵⁹

In April, 1953, a House study mission, chaired by Congressman Judd with Congressmen Merrow, Zablocki, and Carnahan, toured Southeast Asia in connection with hearings for the aid program for fiscal year 1954. Their report supported an increase in both economic and military aid and indicated a bi-partisanship not recently present in foreign affairs.

For the first time, a United States Military Mission visited Indochina to survey the situation first hand.⁶⁰ Previous missions, such as those headed by Griffin and Melby, had looked at the situation in terms of what aid might do to help; now, at the invitation of the French, a purely military mission would look into the need for aid in terms of extent and type. Moreover, this visit enabled the

⁵⁸The New York Times, March 29, 1953.

⁵⁹In particular, Dulles' statement to the American Legion in September, op. cit.

⁶⁰The New York Times, June 20, 1953.

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In April, 1961, a new study mission, headed by
 Congressman John W. McClellan, former, military, and
 Chairman, House Committee on International Relations
 for the first time for United States. Their report ex-
 pected to be known in both military and military and
 indicated a significantly not recently known in foreign
 affairs.

For the first time, a major news military mission
 visited Washington to survey the situation that day.²⁶
 Previous missions, such as those headed by William
 Hall, had been at the situation in case of war and
 report to be very low, at the situation in the United
 States military situation would have been for all in
 terms of arms and type. However, this year marked the

²⁵ The New York Times, March 29, 1961.

²⁶ The New York Times, March 29, 1961. Statement of the mission
 report is reported, pp. 113.

²⁷ The New York Times, June 26, 1961.

United States to get information concerning the war which had heretofore been available only from French sources. This latter point was important for it provided an opportunity to verify or disprove certain basic factors on which policy rested.

The United States assumed that the French were, and would continue, pressing the fight with the accepted goal being the independence of Indochina. Consonant with this, in the United States view, was the need to keep fighting and not allow the situation to bog down into a stalemate. What the mission could perhaps learn was the extent to which these aims were held in common and were being pursued.

On July 3, the French announced their intention to enter into new negotiations concerning the independence and sovereignty of the three Associated States. This belated recognition of the inadequacy of the Elysee agreements was doubtless brought about by a combination of Vietnamese and Cambodian protests together with United States pressure. The announcement was gratifying to the United States, not only for its further reducing the basis for charges of colonialism, but also for its hoped-for effect of creating greater indigenous enthusiasm for the fight for freedom in Indochina. Secretary Dulles considered that, while there had been criticism concerning the lack of French promises

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and beneficial from which all have been benefited.

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for independence for the three states, "the basis for that criticism should now be removed."⁶¹

The end of the war in Korea did release Chinese war material for the Vietminh and the intensity of the combat began to increase. Where Vietminh attacks had been conducted in the style of guerrilla warfare, the increase in supplies permitted them to adopt more conventional methods with increasing frequency. What had been a gradually-rising curve of military success for the French leveled briefly and then worsened.

While this situation was due in part to an increase in aid from the Chinese, it was also attributable to an absence of success in political indoctrination of the populace. Little was known in the West of guerrilla warfare and its vastly differing requirements. Therefore, little attention was paid to what the people wanted, particularly if it did not conform to conventional military plans. But as successful guerrilla warriors, such as Mao Tse Tung, well know, the sympathetic support of the civilian populace is essential for success. That the French did not subscribe to this theory was demonstrated from the very first; in late 1953, the French forces still paid little heed to the desires of the people but, instead, operated on the premise

⁶¹The New York Times, July 4, 1953.

and the authors are grateful to the referees for their constructive comments.

The end of the war in Europe and the end of the war in the Pacific have brought about a new situation in the world. The world is now a more unified world than it was before the war. The world is now a more peaceful world than it was before the war. The world is now a more prosperous world than it was before the war. The world is now a more hopeful world than it was before the war. The world is now a more optimistic world than it was before the war. The world is now a more confident world than it was before the war. The world is now a more secure world than it was before the war. The world is now a more stable world than it was before the war. The world is now a more harmonious world than it was before the war. The world is now a more united world than it was before the war. The world is now a more peaceful world than it was before the war. The world is now a more prosperous world than it was before the war. The world is now a more hopeful world than it was before the war. The world is now a more optimistic world than it was before the war. The world is now a more confident world than it was before the war. The world is now a more secure world than it was before the war. The world is now a more stable world than it was before the war. The world is now a more harmonious world than it was before the war. The world is now a more united world than it was before the war.

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that what was good for France was good for Vietnam. Thus, by the end of the year, the three parties involved in fighting the Vietminh each had different aims: the French were fighting to retain control over Indochina; the Vietnamese were fighting for independence; and the United States was fighting to stop communism. With such diverse points of aim, variations in enthusiasm were inevitable.

By the end of 1953, French resolve had weakened in the face of awesome costs of Indochina, and public opinion in France was active in support of some sort of escape-with-decency. For the United States, any cession of the effort would be a backward move from a stand which dictated keeping the pressure on the communists whenever possible. In a press conference on December 29,⁶² Secretary Dulles spoke of stronger measures by the United States which might be forthcoming should the Chinese attempt to hasten the Vietminh victory by overt intervention. It was not the last to be heard of such stronger measures.

The beginning of 1954 brought with it a disquieting feeling concerning Indochina, but no real indication of the extent of the disappointment to be experienced. From the outset, however, developments seemed to be adverse.

In Indochina, the French had decided to establish, at

⁶²The New York Times, December 30, 1953.

that what was good for France was good for Vietnam. That, by the end of the year, the French parties involved in fighting the Vietnam war had different aims: the French were fighting to regain control over Indochina; the Vietnamese were fighting for independence; and the United States was fighting to stop communism. With such diverse points of view, relations in Indochina were inevitably

By the end of 1953, French resistance had weakened in the face of American costs of Indochina, and public opinion in France was active in support of some sort of escape-via-hierarchy. For the United States, any cessation of the effort would be a blow to the French, and a blow to the United States. The government in the communist movement was

was concerned on December 11, 1953, Secretary Dulles spoke of strategic interests by the United States which might be forthcoming should the Chinese attempt to return the situation to what it was in 1953. It was not too late to be heard at such strategic interests.

The beginning of 1954 brought with it a disquieting feeling among the Chinese that the United States was not as strong as it was in 1953. The United States was expected to be weaker, and, however, the United States was expected to be weaker. In conclusion, the United States was expected to be weaker.

Dien Bien Phu, an outpost of French strength which would at once reassure the civilian populace and convince the Vietminh armies of the superiority of the French forces. Dien Bien Phu was chosen for its proximity to Laos, where the Vietminh had recently become active, and for its position astride the Vietminh supply line from China. Topographically, the position to be defended lay in the bottom of a bowl-shaped formation of hills. There was room enough for a small airfield.

Military history will identify few important defensive positions with the initial shortcomings of Dien Bien Phu. Not only was it remote from the main bases on the coast, with lines of communication by air only, but it was also located so that artillery fire could be poured on it from all directions. Yet to the French, it was defensible by virtue of complete air superiority and the demonstrated lack of artillery in the Vietminh forces.

The United States became involved in Dien Bien Phu early in the siege when two hundred United States personnel were assigned to provide maintenance for the aircraft employed in resupplying the French forces. Congressional interest was aroused lest this be the forerunner to a build-up of American forces, and only assurances from President Eisenhower,⁶³ quieted the general feeling of apprehension.

⁶³Ibid., February 11, 1954.

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 interest was increased, and this was the personnel for a brief
 up of certain letters, and only the personnel from the division
 personnel, and the general feeling of appreciation.

In the last week of January, 1954, the Foreign Ministers of Britain, France, Russia, and the United States met in Berlin to discuss the situations which were creating world unrest. Originally, the agenda included such obvious trouble spots as Berlin and Austria as well as Korea; but, after the meeting began, the situation in Indochina was included.

Whether Britain's Anthony Eden proposed including Indochina as an agenda item⁶⁴ at the forthcoming Geneva Conference, or whether Francis M. Bidault suggested it,⁶⁵ the United States accepted it in the spirit that one accepts castor oil--without liking it and while learning the worst. The apprehension was well borne out.

Agreed upon in Berlin was a Geneva Conference, to be convened April 26, for the "purpose of reaching a peaceful settlement of the Korean questions"⁶⁶ as well as discussing the problem of restoring peace in Indochina. The Chinese communists were to be represented in discussions of both aspects.

Upon his return to the United States from Berlin,

⁶⁴Clubb, op. cit., p. 57.

⁶⁵Speech by Anthony Eden before House of Commons, June 23 and 24, as reported in Vital Speeches, August 1, 1954, p. 578.

⁶⁶The New York Times, February 19, 1954.

On May 1st, 1954, the Foreign
Minister of Britain, Harold Macmillan, and the United States
was in Berlin to discuss the situation which was developing
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problems as Berlin and Korea as well as Europe, but,
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discussed.

British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden proposed including
Indochina as an agenda item⁶⁴ in the forthcoming Geneva Con-
ference, or rather Francis W. Pickens suggested it, the
United States accepted it in the spirit that was already
expressed at the time of the 1953-54 meeting. The
The agreement was not made yet.

Agreed upon in Berlin was a Geneva Conference, to be
convened April 1954, for the purpose of reaching a peaceful
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the problem of restoring peace in Indochina. The Chinese
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subjects.

When the United States and the United States and Britain,

⁶⁴ Ibid., pp. 252-253.

⁶⁵ Speech by Anthony Eden before House of Commons,
June 11 and 12, as reported in Times, London, August 1,
1954, p. 1.

⁶⁶ The New York Times, January 19, 1954.

Secretary Dulles found himself under attack from all directions for his acceptance of the agenda for the upcoming Geneva Conference. Criticism from the Republican Party was both the most unexpected and the most vehement. Senator Knowland was a particularly outspoken critic.⁶⁷ What the critics found most unacceptable was the participation of the Chinese communists and the possibility that one result of the conference would be United States recognition of China. Senator Dulles found it necessary to reassure both the public and the Congress that such would not be the case.

Following the agreements in Berlin, military activity in Vietnam increased in tempo and successes of the Vietminh became more numerous. Where the French had been hopeful of maintaining a status quo in order to strengthen their bargaining position, they now found their position becoming weaker by the day. The increased supplies from China, the active support of the civilian population, and good leadership, enabled the Vietminh to take the offensive despite a numerical inferiority of two to one and no air power.

On March 13, 1954, the Vietminh siege of Dien Bien Phu began. Now equipped with field artillery emplaced in the hills around the area, General Giap's forces commenced a relentless bombardment of the French positions, concentrating first in the airfield. With French air supply reduced

⁶⁷Ibid., February 23 and 24, 1954.

to practically nothing, the Communists proceeded systematically to overrun the peripheral French positions one by one.

So critical had the military situation become that the French were constrained to request direct military assistance from the United States--something they had not done before. In so doing, they provided the ground work for an internal crisis which brought the United States to the brink of intervention.

From about mid-March until the end of April, events in Washington moved rapidly and in an atmosphere of secrecy. Beginning with the visit of General Ely on March 20, the subject of intervention, unilateral or united, using ground forces or not, occupied much of the official thinking.

Accounts of what took place during that critical period are, unfortunately, all unofficial since none of the principals involved has chosen to write or speak on the subject. Nevertheless, these unofficial reports have been detailed enough to permit an understanding of what went on. Two of the better known, which have had wide acceptance, are the accounts of Chalmers Roberts,⁶⁸ and Joseph C. Harsch.⁶⁹

⁶⁸Chalmers Roberts, "The Day We Didn't Go to War," The Reporter, September 14, 1954, pp. 32-35, as reprinted in World of Crisis, by F. H. Hartman (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1962), pp. 240-247.

⁶⁹Joseph C. Harsch, Christian Science Monitor, April 29 and May 9, 1954.

The former account, in particular, has become the semi-official authority for happenings in early April.

General Ely's visit to Washington was in the nature of an emergency mission. As Chief of Staff of French forces, he was a knowledgeable emissary to send seeking military assistance, and he was also sufficiently high in the hierarchy of the French government to merit the attention of the political as well as the military leaders in Washington. According to the Roberts' account, General Ely gathered the impression from his visit that the United States would respond with direct assistance at any time that France so desired, and he notified Paris to this effect. Whether his impression was correct or not, the shock created by his report of the seriousness of the situation in Indochina did set United States leaders to thinking and talking about intervention.⁷⁰

On March 29, Secretary Dulles spoke of the need for "united action" to prevent the communists from taking over Southeast Asia. He expressed a willingness to act firmly, and he hoped that any potential aggressor was listening concerning the forthcoming conference at Geneva--the aim there

⁷⁰ S. Adams, Firsthand Report (New York: Harper & Bros., 1961). According to Adams, the French asked for air strikes in support of Dien Bien Phu. President Eisenhower was against such support; Admiral Radford was for it-- p. 12.

The former member of parliament, who became the first
 official minister for agriculture in early 1961, was
 General Aik's visit to Washington was in the spring
 of an emergency situation. As Chief of State of Vietnam for-
 mer, he was a knowledgeable authority on South Vietnam's sit-
 uation, and he was also sufficiently high in the
 hierarchy of the French government to secure the attention of
 the political as well as the military leaders in Washington,
 according to the Kennedy account, General Aik's presence was
 instrumental from his visit to the United States would
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 desired, and he would be able to do this without further his
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 not United States leaders to thinking and talking about
 intervention.¹⁰

In June 1961, Secretary-Director of the State for
 Foreign Affairs, in person the committee was talking over
 Foreign Affairs. He expressed a willingness to do this,
 and he found that any potential agreement was lacking and
 during the forthcoming conference at Geneva—the one that

¹⁰ Aik, 17 March 1961 (New York, version 4)
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was "to bring about a united and independent Korea." As for Indochina, he hoped the discussions would seek to convince the Chinese communists of the error of their ways.⁷¹ Four days later, Secretary Dulles and Admiral Radford held the emergency briefing for Congressmen, which Mr. Roberts covered in detail in his article. If the narrative is accurate--and there is no evidence to indicate that it is not--it was a day on which the United States approached as near to war as it could without being fully and finally committed. It was not a "doves and hawks" episode but rather a meeting between hawks and owls--and the owls prevailed.

The crisis was not over by any means; it was just narrowed to exclude unilateral intervention as being wholly unacceptable to the people and to the Congress. Joint action with Allies, however, remained a possibility.

In early April, at a meeting at the White House, President Eisenhower had agreed to the request of Mr. Dulles and Admiral Radford to send American forces into Indochina "under certain strict conditions." In essence, these conditions specified, first, that the French would have to continue to fight in Indochina until the war was successfully

⁷¹ Before Overseas Club, New York, as reported in The New York Times, March 30, 1954.

was not being about a million and independent issues. As for
 industrial, he hoped the discussion would lead to convincing
 the Chinese community of the sense of their duty. The
 day later, Secretary of State and Assistant Secretary of State
 emergency during the war, which Mr. Roberts
 referred to in his article. In the meantime, it
 is not clear if the evidence for industrial growth is as
 good as it was a day or two ago. The United States approached it
 with a view to its own economic future and finally
 completed. It was not a success and some people but
 rather a meeting between them and others and the only one
 held.

The crisis was not over by any means, it was just
 entered in which industrial production is being really
 responded to by the people and by the Congress. Some
 action with other countries remained a possibility.
 In early April, at a meeting at the White House,

President Roosevelt was asked for his opinion of the United
 States and its role in the world. He said that the United States
 "must be able to stand on its own feet. It must be able to
 defend itself. It must be able to stand on its own feet. It
 must be able to stand on its own feet. It must be able to stand on its own feet."

concluded and, second, that United States participation would be as a part of a force composed of Australian, British, and New Zealand troops, plus units from Far East countries, such as Thailand and the Philippines.⁷²

On April 7, President Eisenhower publicly joined the discussion group when he referred to the situation in Southeast Asia in terms of the "falling domino" principle.⁷³ On April 5, Secretary Dulles told the House Committee on Foreign Affairs that the United States was determined to prevent Indochina from falling into the hands of the communists.⁷⁴ On April 16, Vice President Nixon iterated that the United States would face up to what must be done in Indochina to keep the communists out.⁷⁵ It was clear that the United States considered the situation to be extremely grave and that action was necessary.

⁷²Adams, op. cit., p. 122. The French view of this was less enthusiastic, however. The Secretary General of the Foreign Affairs Study Center (Paris), M. Jacques Vernant, writing in Revue de Defense Nationale (April 1964, p. 707) cites General Ely as stating France was lukewarm to Allied intervention. To the French, time was critical and the delay incident to obtaining Allied approval would have been fatal.

⁷³The New York Times, April 8, 1954.

⁷⁴King, op. cit., p. 169.

⁷⁵Address to Newspaper Editors Convention, April 16, 1954, Washington. The speech was "off the record" but was widely publicized that the Department of State felt it necessary to issue a policy statement in clarification and rebuttal.

Having had to abandon the concept of unilateral intervention, the United States turned to the multilateral concept. Here, however, success was no easier to attain. From the first, Britain had opposed the idea and had successfully prevented any real progress among the other would-be Allies. As it became known later, Britain was opposed to the armed intervention for

. . . three reasons which then seemed to be good and still seem to be good. Firstly, we were advised that air action alone could not have been effective; secondly, any such military intervention could have destroyed the chances of a settlement at Geneva; thirdly, it might well have led to a general war in Asia.⁷⁶

In early April, however, Secretary Dulles did not have available to him this reasoning; all that he knew was that Britain was obstructing progress. Therefore, he proposed a visit to London, was accepted, and on April 10 departed for Europe.

The reception given Mr. Dulles must have convinced him of the futility of near-term intervention, for he then proposed the creation of SEATO. After a brief stop in Paris, Mr. Dulles returned to the United States on April 15. What he had accomplished was little in terms of his original mission, but he did come away with approval of the concept of a regional defense organization.

⁷⁶Foreign Minister Eden in House of Commons, June 23 and 24, as reported in Vital Speeches, August, 1954, p. 578.

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Apparently, one final attempt at gaining British approval for military action in Indochina was made by Secretary Dulles on April 23 and 24. In Paris enroute to Geneva, the Secretary, according to Mr. Roberts' account, sought British agreement to assist the French, but the reply was still "no."⁷⁷

On the day that the Geneva Conference met to begin discussions of the Korean questions, President Eisenhower again spoke of the importance the United States attached to preventing a communist take-over of Indochina by stating: "We have here a sort of cork in the bottle, the bottle being the great area that includes Burma, Thailand, and Indochina."⁷⁸ Secretary Dulles, on the eve of the first meeting in Geneva to discuss Indochina, spoke to the country by radio, citing the danger which threatened Southeast Asia and what the United States had done in the past. He then stated that the pressing need now was for collective defense to resist this expansion of international communism.⁷⁹ This then, the need for collective defense, was a recurrent one in speeches made during the next four months.

⁷⁷Mr. Roberts reports that this was the end of any serious interest on the part of the United States to intervene in Indochina.

⁷⁸Before the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Washington, April 26, as reported in The New York Times, April 27.

⁷⁹Secretary Dulles' speech May 7, as reported in The New York Times, May 8, 1954.

Accordingly, the United States is joining British
approval for military action in Indonesia and will by January
begin to send military aid to the Indonesian Government.
The Secretary, according to Mr. Roberts' account, sought
to bring attention to the fact that the United States
is not alone in supporting the Indonesian Government.

On the day that the United States Conference was in session
discussions of the United States' position in Indonesia
were held by the Indonesian Government. The United States
position was described as one of support for the Indonesian
Government. A statement was made by the Indonesian Government
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The Secretary, according to the report of the United States
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¹⁷ Mr. Roberts reported that this was the end of any
national interest on the part of the United States in
Indonesia.

¹⁸ The United States U.S. Conference on Communism, Washington,
April 25, as reported in the New York Times, April 27.
¹⁹ The Secretary's report, May 7, as reported in the
New York Times, May 8, 1955.

On May 7, 1954, Dien Bien Phu surrendered to the Vietminh forces after fifty-five days of siege. For the last month, the French had been unable to do more than provide some airlift for the wounded and to parachute a few supplies to the fort. As the outposts were overrun, the area shrank to the point where even helicopter operations could not be conducted.

From the beginning, Dien Bien Phu had been stamped with the brand of misfortune. Not only was it remote from French (and United States) sources of supplies, it was convenient to supply bases in China. Thus, one of its early advantages, that of artillery superiority, was soon overcome and reversed. The Vietminh strategy was one of gradual erosion⁸⁰ of the perimeter positions together with concentrated attacks upon the air facilities. In due course, this attrition of the air communications precluded the effective resupply of the besieged forces and presaged their ultimate defeat. It was a significant victory for the Vietminh, not only for its effect upon the Geneva Conference but for its psychological value to the Vietminh themselves. Earlier in the war (1951) the French had been able to defeat Vietminh forces in direct confrontations.⁸¹ Now, for the first time,

⁸⁰General V. N. Giap, People's War, People's Army (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), pp. 210-214.

⁸¹Ibid., p. xxxvii. This portion of the book is a Profile of Giap, by Bernard F. Fall.

native forces were victorious. The victory date became an important day of celebration in North Vietnam for it not only set a favorable stage for the Geneva Conference, but it further solidified popular acceptance, and even support, of the Vietminh throughout Indochina.⁸²

In Geneva, the first plenary session devoted to the Indochina question met May 8. Except in the case of the United States, the countries attending were represented by their Foreign Ministers with Chou En-Lai sitting in for Communist China. The United States was represented by Under Secretary of State Smith.

The first session was taken up by the French Foreign Minister, M. Bidault, setting forth the French position which called for an immediate cease-fire to be followed by discussion of the political problems. In Indochina, the fall of Dien Bien Phu had freed additional Vietminh troops and large-scale attacks against French positions in the Red River Delta had begun. An early termination of hostilities was to the advantage of France. After the cease-fire, Vietminh and Vietnamese forces were to be withdrawn to areas to be specified and all Vietminh troops were to be evacuated from Laos and Cambodia.

⁸²Ibid., p. 168.

The Vietminh counter proposals, presented May 10, included the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Indochina, the holding of elections and the recognition of Vietminh-sponsored governments in Laos and Cambodia. As a possible attraction to the French, the matter of membership in the French Union and protection of French interests were to receive full consideration.

As initial proposals, each attracted supporters in accordance with established political doctrine; Russia and China supported the Vietminh and Britain and the United States supported France. In the circumstances, the discussions became mired in a welter of speeches, all aimed at improving one's own position in the negotiations. Concessions of significance did not seem to be forthcoming from either side, and the conference neared the point of breakdown. Faced with this, a gradual easing of the intransigence on both sides began to be evident.

On May 25, Mr. Eden suggested that military representatives from both sides come to Geneva to assist in arriving at an agreement for an armistice. On May 29, this proposal was accepted, and it was announced that armistice negotiations between the French Union and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam would be undertaken immediately. It was the first progress of note to be made, but it immediately raised new problems on which deadlock was quickly established. The

The Vietnam census proposals, presented May 10, 1960, claimed the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Indochina, the holding of elections and the recognition of Vietnam as a sovereign state in Laos and Cambodia. As a prelude to the French, the census was a matter of necessity in the French Union and protection of French interests were to receive full consideration.

In initial proposals, each of the four countries is mentioned with established political borders, Russia and China supported the Vietnam and Britain and the United States supported France. In the circumstances, the discussion became stuck in a matter of procedure. All agreed that the four countries had no position in the negotiations. The question of significance did not seem to be forthcoming from either side, and the conference moved the point of discussion down. Then after this, a gradual easing of the formal grounds on both sides began to be evident.

On May 23, Mr. Bao also suggested that military expansion be limited from both sides and in return he asked in return as an agreement for an agreement. On May 24, this proposal was accepted, and it was announced that another meeting would follow before the French Union and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam would be undertaken immediately. It was the first proposal of note to be made, and it immediately raised new problems on which decisions were quickly established. The

composition and authority of the Armistice Commission occupied the attention of the delegates and, for the next two weeks, dominated discussions at Geneva. Russia proposed Czechoslovakia, Poland, India, and Pakistan as members; the United States objected on the grounds that a commission composed of equal members of communists and non-communists had proved useless in Korea. China rejected a Vietnamese proposal to have the United Nations accept responsibility for maintaining the armistice, and Russia rejected a British proposal that commission members come from Colombo power countries.

Meanwhile, the Government of French Premier Laniel fell on June 12, and with it hopes that the deadlock in Geneva could be resolved quickly dimmed.

In the United States, meanwhile, Secretary Dulles continued to urge collective defense. In a press conference on May 25, he indicated that collective security in Southeast Asia was something the United States had supported since 1951;⁸³ and, in a major address in Los Angeles on June 11,⁸⁴ he disavowed unilateral intervention by the United States in the present circumstances. He added, however,

⁸³The New York Times, May 26, 1954.

⁸⁴Before the World Affairs Council, Los Angeles, June 11, as reported in The New York Times, June 12, 1954.

[illegible]

that if the Chinese intervened openly, then the situation would be changed and the United States might well intervene.

The crisis in France passed more quickly than had been expected and, on June 17, M. Mendes-France was confirmed as the new Premier. His initial speech to the Assembly was to promise to do all possible to attain peace in Indochina and to resign from office if he had not achieved it by July 20. He also promised that, in attaining peace "France will maintain her presence in the Far East."⁸⁵

Coincident or not, business at the Conference began to improve with the arrival of M. Mendes-France. Agreements on the timing of discussions on Cambodia and Laos, and post-armistice elections in Vietnam, and political settlement between Chou En-Lai and Mendes-France were reached. Despite this progress, however, there remained the question of whether or not the French Assembly would accept the final outcome--a question which remained unanswered until the end.

Toward the end of June, an undeclared recess for the principals appeared to be desirable. Eden, accompanied by Prime Minister Churchill, came to Washington for meetings with President Eisenhower on June 25. Chou En-Lai returned to Peking via New Delhi and Rangoon where he had conferences with Nehru and U Nu. The intermission was doubtless

⁸⁵Speech in French National Assembly, June 17, 1954, as reported in Vital Speeches, August 1, 1954, p. 585.

profitable in the long run, if for no other reason than that it provided a respite in which informal consultations could take place.

The Churchill-Eisenhower meetings in Washington ended without resolution of major differences. A final communiqué, however, iterated the common ties and reaffirmed the strength of the alliance.⁸⁶ The principal difference was that concerning admission of Communist China to the United Nations and Congressional reaction to this was volatile. In an election year, any such "softness" toward communism was political suicide and the orators of both parties lost no time in denouncing it.

The conference resumed in an atmosphere of general optimism. Partition of Vietnam, at least temporarily, seemed to be the solution, and it was toward this end that both sides proceeded. For the United States, however, this concept, or the alternative of a coalition government, seemed to doom Vietnam to communism; and, therefore, it was not welcomed. General Smith had not returned to Geneva so the United States appeared to be disassociating itself from the conference.

This reluctance on the part of the United States to participate in the negotiations caused M. Mendes-France to

⁸⁶ The New York Times, June 30, 1954.

provision is not made, it is for the purpose of the fact
it provides a means in which interest relations could

be given.

The Committee's findings in the report were

without reference to any of the following: A final committee

however, stated the common law and testimony the strength

of the Alliance.¹⁰ The following statement was that the

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The committee's report is an attempt to explain

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which is in the position, and it was never said and now

propose a Paris meeting of Eden, Dulles and himself with a view to seeking some resolution of the difficulty. The outcome of the meeting, held July 13 and 14, was to return General Smith to Geneva but to "reserve" the United States position on the final settlement.

General Smith arrived back in Geneva on July 17 as the settlement was in its final stages of preparation. In view of the United States attitude toward the discussions, it is probable that the American delegation took no direct part in the negotiations at this time but remained on the sidelines, proffering advice through the French delegation.

Early in the morning of July 21, the Vietnam armistice was signed, followed later in the day by the signing of the Cambodian and Laotian truce agreements. The final conference declaration was not signed but was accepted by all except the United States and the State of Vietnam, both of whom issued unilateral declarations. The United States declaration "took note" of the agreements concluded and declared that it would "refrain from the threat or the use of violence to disturb them."

The main provisions of the armistice agreement for Vietnam were the demarcation line roughly along the 17th parallel, the withdrawal of French and Vietminh forces from North and South Vietnam, respectively, within three hundred days, and the release of all prisoners of war and civilian

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internees within thirty days. The agreements for Laos and Cambodia generally called for the withdrawal of all foreign troops except for small French training missions, and freedom from discrimination for members of opposing forces. Supervision of the execution of the armistice would be provided by an International Commission composed of representatives of India, Canada, and Poland--with the Indian representative acting as Chairman in each case.

The declaration noted the full independence of the three states and provided for free elections by secret ballot in each. Cambodia and Laos were to have elections in 1955 and Vietnam in July, 1956. The Vietnamese, but not the Cambodian nor Laotian, elections were to be supervised by the International Commission. None of the three could enter into military alliances or permit military bases under foreign control to be established on their territory except for two French bases in Laos.

Reactions to the conference agreements were varied. Russia and China hailed them as major achievements and particularly the parts relating to the prohibition of alliances. Britain regarded them as preventing World War III and a demonstration of superior British diplomacy. France greeted them with relief at seeing the end of the war, and despite what Mendes-France termed "harsh and sometimes cruel

instruments within thirty days. The agreement for Japan and Canada generally called for the withdrawal of all foreign troops except for small garrisons (training missions) and five-ten thousand troops for the purpose of securing peace. The decision on the resolution of the committee would be given by an international committee composed of representatives of India, Canada, and United States and Japan. The committee would be formed in 1955.

The decision noted the 1954 independence of the three states and provided for the withdrawal of troops by 1955. Canada and Japan had to have troops in 1955 and Vietnam in July, 1955. The Vietnamese, but not the Canadian nor Indian, officials were to be supervised by the International Committee. None of the three could enter into military alliances or make military bases under any sign contract to be established on their territory except the two French bases in Laos.

According to the committee agreement, the United States and China would have no major military bases and no military bases except for the provision of the provision of the United States and China. The United States and China would have no military bases and no military bases except for the provision of the provision of the United States and China. The United States and China would have no military bases and no military bases except for the provision of the provision of the United States and China.

terms,⁸⁷ the Assembly approved the agreements with enthusiasm.

In the United States, however, the reception was less favorable. Both political parties regarded the agreements as a diplomatic defeat, but the matter did not become a significant campaign issue. Inasmuch as the result came from actions and policies carried out by both parties, there could, in honesty, be no more blame on one than on the other. Nevertheless, the Democrats could not resist the temptation to point at the inconsistencies between Geneva and the Republican campaign promises of two years ago.

The United States agreed to aid South Vietnam in repatriating civilians from Northern Vietnam and made available military sea transport for that purpose. The actual transfer was accomplished during the winter months of 1954-1955 and in sufficient time to meet the May, 1955, deadline.

Immediately after Geneva, the French took steps to insure the presence of French interests in North Vietnam. Premier Mendes-France appointed Jean Sainteny, a personal friend of Ho Chi Minh, as French representative with the Vietminh, and M. Sainteny negotiated agreements relating to French citizens and business interests in Tonking.⁸⁸ The

⁸⁷Speech in Assembly, July 22, as reported in The New York Times, July 23.

⁸⁸Low, op. cit., p. 175.

United States was opposed to this relationship as being inimical to the interests of South Vietnam, but to no avail.

The immediate post-Geneva period saw the United States striving to regain equilibrium in the conduct of foreign affairs. In Europe, the defeat of the European Defense Community by France on August 30 bespoke the need for reassessment in that area. In Southeast Asia, 1954 had seen the United States run the gamut. As Joseph C. Harsch wrote "in April, the United States walked up to the brink of war with Communist China and turned away. This week it walked up to the brink of a dissolution of the alliance, and also turned back."⁸⁹ Now having returned to the fold, the United States sought to emphasize its ties with others. Earlier in the year, United States leadership was the dominant theme as when Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Robertson testified before the House Committee on Appropriations:

. . . A cold war waged under the leadership of the United States, with the constant threat of attack against Red China, led by Formosa and other Far Eastern groups and meticulously supported by the United States.⁹⁰

Now the emphasis was on partnership and collective security. As President Eisenhower stated in a press conference on

⁸⁹ Christian Science Monitor, July 17, 1954.

⁹⁰ Congressional Record, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 125.

August 4, ". . . we are trying to be a good partner."⁹¹ In effect, while deploring what had happened in Indochina, the United States turned hopefully to the development of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization as the instrument best suited to further United States interests in Southeast Asia.

This discussion has been confined to what transpired in Vietnam, principally because that was the main area of action, and not because of any intent to slight, or underplay, Cambodia and Laos. These two kingdoms, nominally independent under French supervision, had been beside, not in, the ebb and flow of conflict in Vietnam. The Vietminh had encouraged dissident groups in both countries but, until late 1953, its strength had not been sufficient to support the anti-French movements in either.

Then, too little time remained before Geneva. In Cambodia, resistance was embodied in the so-called Khmer government and in Laos in the Pathet-Lao. The Vietminh, at Geneva, sought recognition of both but was unsuccessful.⁹² The effect of the Geneva Agreements upon both countries was to neutralize them with full independence.

⁹¹The New York Times, August 5, 1954.

⁹²Low, op. cit., p. 155.

Collective Security

Advocacy by the United States of the principle of collective security, as countenanced in the United Nations Charter, stems mainly from the Vanderberg Resolution of June 11, 1948. This declaration called for the "progressive development" of collective arrangements for self-defense in accordance with the Charter and "association of the United States" with such arrangements. This resolve was, however, not to be actively pursued by the United States insofar as Southeast Asia was concerned until three years later.

Prior to the communist victory in China, the United States had centered its attentions in the Asian theater on Japan and Nationalist China, with an occasional interest in the Philippines and Indonesia. As long as the political situation in Asia remained oriented in a pro-Western direction, the need for collective defense arrangements was not apparent. With communist success in China, however, the situation changed. Chinese communists on the Indochinese border posed a definite threat not only to Indochina but to the remainder of Southeast Asia. The United States began to evince an increased interest in the affairs of the area, but this concern did not yet include a desire for collective security agreements.

The Korean War, superimposed upon the collapse of Nationalist China, highlighted the need for a major revision

in United States policy vis-à-vis Asia. The original post-war policy had been predicated upon having a strong and friendly China exercising influence over the area and promoting stability. When it was obvious that the combined conditions of strength and friendliness were no longer to be found in China, change was necessary. In these circumstances the United States turned toward Japan and commenced negotiations to secure a peace treaty which would reestablish, to some extent, Japanese strength and influence. These negotiations, in turn, developed situations which required further revisions of policy.

It was apparent in seeking acceptance of a Japanese peace treaty that the governments of the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand were concerned for their future safety should Japan be permitted to gain enough strength to become an aggressor again. Accordingly, they sought assurances of protection from the United States as conditions of their acceptance of the Japanese peace treaty. The United States acceded to their wishes and concluded a treaty of mutual defense with the Philippines on August 30, 1951, and a mutual security treaty for the Pacific Ocean area, the ANZUS Treaty, with New Zealand and Australia on September 1, 1951.

In reporting on the ANZUS Treaty, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee said:

in United States policy towards Asia. The official policy
 has been and has remained unchanged since 1898 and
 is today still governing American policy in Asia and the
 Pacific. It is the policy of the United States to
 maintain the status quo in the Pacific and to
 oppose any change which would result in a
 weakening of the United States position in the
 Pacific. This policy is based on the fact that
 the United States has a special interest in the
 Pacific and that any change in the status quo
 would be to the disadvantage of the United States.
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 oppose any change which would result in a
 weakening of the United States position in the
 Pacific. This policy is based on the fact that
 the United States has a special interest in the
 Pacific and that any change in the status quo
 would be to the disadvantage of the United States.

The desire of Australia and New Zealand to establish some sort of security relationship with the United States is understandable. As a result of World War II, these countries feared the resurgence of Japanese aggression and they were deeply concerned about the possibility of Japanese rearmament. Their national inclination, therefore, was to think in terms of a peace treaty that would make such eventualities impossible. They would agree to a generous treaty imposing no restrictions upon Japanese rearmament only if the United States would formally express concern for their security and agree to stand with them in the event of an attack. The security treaty between the United States on the one hand, and Australia and New Zealand on the other hand, gave these countries the assurance they needed and, at the same time served the national interests of the United States.⁹³

Two other aspects of the ANZUS Treaty are of interest. The first is the indefinite and undefined "Pacific Ocean Area" to which the Treaty was applicable. The accepted interpretation was that the area consisted of all of the Southwest Pacific except the mainland of Southeast Asia but especially those waters contiguous to Australia. The second feature was the exclusion of European powers, particularly the United Kingdom, from the Treaty. The United Kingdom had hoped to be a party to the Treaty and to have Malaya included in its coverage. The United States, however, was unwilling to accede to either wish, preferring instead to maintain the anti-colonial aura of the pact. The principal result of this exclusion was a continuing interest on the

⁹³United States Congress, Senate Executive Report No. 2, 82d Congress, 2d Session, February 14, 1952.

part of the United Kingdom in forming a further collective security organization to which she could belong. To this end, she was ready to accept the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization in 1954 despite disagreeing with both its membership and its timing.

ANZUS was an important step for the United States; and, in spite of its obvious inherent limitations, the Treaty established an essential precedent for participation in multilateral collective security in Southeast Asia. It was not demanding of significant expense or effort on the part of any signatory, and it did permit the United States to strengthen Japan to a greater degree than would have been possible otherwise.

The greatest shortcoming of ANZUS as an instrument of United States policy in the Far East was, of course, the lack of non-Western members. While the Treaty was originally aimed at preventing Japanese aggression, it carried with it the ancillary intent of deterring communism; and this aspect, in particular, required Southeast Asian participation. Moreover, a gathering of Western nations was not attractive to Asians who were recently free, despite the fact that none of the Western group had a history of colonialism.

One final point which was to have continuing pertinence: when the NATO Treaty was signed, it contained a

part of the common discipline in the United States and the
 American people to which we are bound. In this
 and, we are ready to accept the American side of the
 Organization in 1941. American people are now in
 a position to do this.

There is an important way for the United States

and, in light of the obvious American limitations, the
 Treaty of 1941 on American procedure for discussion
 in the United States is not only in the United States. It
 was not necessary of significant expense to allow on the
 part of any country, and it is the United States
 to strengthen them to a lesser degree than we have been
 possible otherwise.

The general situation of things as an instrument of

United States policy in the past was, of course, the
 fact of non-interference. While the Treaty was origi-
 nally aimed at preventing American aggression, it carried
 with it the necessity of deterring aggression and this
 aspect, in particular, required American participation
 in the world. A gathering of American nations was not
 attractive to Japan who were recently there, Japan was
 that they were of the Western group and a history of violence
 alien.

One final point which was to have continuing force

namely, when the Treaty was signed, it contained a

provision whereby an attack upon one member was considered to be an attack upon all; no further declaration of war by the Congress was necessary for the United States to become involved. This usurpation of Congressional prerogative by the Executive did not go unnoticed, and the Senate was not prone to consent to another treaty which contained a similar provision. Returning to what Ambassador Dulles termed "Monroe Doctrine Language,"⁹⁴ the ANZUS Treaty, as well as the Mutual Defense Treaty with the Philippines, provided for each of the signatories to "act to meet the common dangers in accordance with its constitutional process." This permissive feature became standard language in subsequent treaties.⁹⁵

SEATO

In early 1953, the United Kingdom, taking advantage of a change of Presidents, proposed to the United States the

⁹⁴Before Senate Hearing as reported in The New York Times, January 29, 1952.

⁹⁵United States Congress, Senate Executive Report A, 83d Congress, 2d Session. This aspect was further discussed in this light in the course of hearings on the Korean Defense Treaty. The committee then noted that the use of this formula "permits the United States to take any action deemed appropriate by our constitutional processes, and gives adequate assurance of support to the other country which may be the victim of an attack. It has the additional advantage of never having been challenged throughout our history, from the constitutional stand point, as attaining the balance of power between the President and Congress."

formation of a strong defense organization for Southeast Asia--in effect, extending the principle of NATO to Southeast Asia.⁹⁶ In this proposal, the United Kingdom had the tacit approval of France. The United States, however, opposed the suggestion inasmuch as it appeared to offer more disadvantage than gain.

In the first place, ANZUS had been in being only a year, and the need further to change policies by including the United Kingdom and France was not apparent. Rather, an important reason for excluding them--fear of indicating support of colonialism in Southeast Asia--seemed to be strengthened. There were, however, differences of opinion within the government concerning the desirability of any multilateral arrangement between East and West along the lines of NATO. The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations had stated its conviction that "a multilateral agreement for the Pacific, comparable to the North Atlantic Treaty, would be desirable." Secretary Dulles, however, responded

that substantial cultural, political, and geographical difference existed among the Pacific countries which distinguished this area from Europe and constituted serious obstacles to achieving the desired development at an early date.

The Committee acknowledged these difficulties "but nevertheless expressed the hope that the Department of State would

⁹⁶Low, op. cit., p. 212.

continue its efforts to encourage" such an arrangement for regional defense.⁹⁷ This Congressional interest in a multi-lateral arrangement for the Pacific did evoke at least thought within the Executive Branch, and President Eisenhower spoke for "United action" in Southeast Asia⁹⁸ as a policy aim of the United States.

Early in 1954, the efforts of the United States to organize a regional collective security defense pact for Southeast Asia became more noticeable. Following the Foreign Ministers meeting in Berlin, the disappointment over France's reluctance to carry on with the fight in Indochina was accompanied by the realization that unilateral intervention by the United States was unacceptable, particularly if it involved the use of American ground forces. Even his own political party turned on Secretary Dulles, saying they would hold him responsible in getting the United States involved in war.⁹⁹ Yet this possibility continued to loom large as Ho Chi Minh continued to make substantial gains in Indochina. Within the government, there was increasing pressure to do something to halt communist advances in

⁹⁷Reported in Senate Executive Report No. 1, 84th Congress, 1st Session, as having taken place at Committee Hearing on Korean Defense Treaty.

⁹⁸The New York Times, April 17, 1953.

⁹⁹Ibid., February 23, 1954.

Southeast Asia. Secretary Dulles, in a speech in New York on March 29, called for "united action"¹⁰⁰ to meet the threat; yet, five days later, Dulles, meeting with Congressional leaders, sought approval for unilateral action.¹⁰¹ Their demurral gave added impetus to the search for an instrument for "united action."

On April 10, Secretary Dulles flew to Europe for conferences, first in London and then Paris. From the statement issued after the meetings, it could be surmised that the principal subject discussed was collective defense in Southeast Asia. The joint statement by Dulles and the Foreign Ministers on April 14, 1951, read:

We recognize that the prolongation of the war in Indochina, which endangers the security of the countries immediately affected, also threatens the entire area of Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific. In close association with other nations, we will examine the possibility of establishing, within the framework of the United Nations Charter, a collective defense to assure the peace, security, and freedom of this area.¹⁰²

Having reached broad agreement with the United Kingdom and France on the subject, United States policy appeared to be firmly oriented toward collective action in Southeast Asia. The President said, in a press conference on May 5,

¹⁰⁰The New York Times, March 30, 1954.

¹⁰¹Hartman, op. cit., p. 242.

¹⁰²The New York Times, April 15, 1954.

Secretary, Asian Monetary Union, in a speech in New York

on March 29, called for "united action" ¹⁰⁰ to meet the

challenge yet, 2500 days later, Asian, meeting with common-

stock leaders, sought approval for unilateral action. ¹⁰¹

These demands gave added impetus to the search for an

instrument for "united action."

On April 10, Secretary Dulles flew to Europe for con-

ferences, first in London and then Paris. From the latter

he returned with the message, it could be assumed that

the political subject discussed was collective defense in

European Asia. The joint statement by Dulles and the four

other Ministers on April 14, 1951, reads:

We recognize that the protection of the sea in

Europe, which ensures the security of the com-

merce is of primary importance, and therefore the

security of the sea in Europe and the Western

Pacific, is of great importance to the world.

We will examine the possibility of establishing

within the framework of the United Nations Charter,

a collective defense to ensure the peace, security,

and freedom of this area. ¹⁰²

Having reached broad agreement with the United Kingdom

and France on the subject, Dulles' states policy appeared to

be fairly extended toward collective action in Europe.

Asia. The statement said, in a press conference on May 1,

¹⁰⁰ See New York Times, March 29, 1951.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., April 11, 1951.

¹⁰² See New York Times, April 11, 1951.

that "most free nations of the area had shown affirmative interest"¹⁰³ in the concept; and Secretary Dulles, at a news conference on May 25, gave the principle historical respectability by saying:

The position of the United States towards collective security in Southeast Asia has been known basically for quite a long while. In fact it really goes back to the time when I went out to the Far East in, I think, January of 1951, on a Mission to try and create a collective security pact in that area.¹⁰⁴

By June, 1954, the only points of difference concerning the pact were in regard to membership and timing. In these matters, the United States and the United Kingdom represented the extreme positions: the United Kingdom wanted to proceed slowly in setting up the organization, waiting at least until the Geneva Conference was concluded, and to include the Colombo powers¹⁰⁵ as members; the United States was anxious to get the organization going and did not agree on the importance of including the Colombo powers.¹⁰⁶

The end of the Geneva Conference brought resolution of these differences. Within three weeks of the Geneva Declaration, the SEATO Conference was scheduled to meet, and

¹⁰³Ibid., May 6, 1954.

¹⁰⁴Ibid., May 26, 1954.

¹⁰⁵India, Pakistan, Burma, Ceylon, and Indonesia.

¹⁰⁶Chatham House Study Group, Collective Defense in Southeast Asia (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1956), pp. 2-5.

the Colombo powers had been invited to participate. To no one's surprise, all except Pakistan declined. Pakistan's acceptance was more likely the result of a "don't-follow-India" principle than a dedication to Southeast Asian defense.¹⁰⁷

On September 6, 1954, the SEATO Conference convened in Manila with delegations present from Australia, France, New Zealand, Philippines, Thailand, United Kingdom, and United States. Some comment was caused by the absence of Mr. Eden, which some credited to M. Nehru's adverse attitude toward the conference. The official, and accepted, explanation, however, was that it was caused by the crisis in Europe at that time--the fall of the European Defense Community.¹⁰⁸

The work of the conference was speedily completed and, on September 8, 1954, the Treaty establishing SEATO was signed.¹⁰⁹ Also signed was the Pacific Charter, sponsored by the Philippines, which pledged SEATO members to "uphold the principles of equal rights and self-determination of people" and "to promote self-government and to secure the

¹⁰⁷Barnett, op. cit., p. 316.

¹⁰⁸Low, op. cit., p. 217.

¹⁰⁹Signing for the United States was Secretary Dulles with Senators Smith and Mansfield.

the Columbia power has been looking at the situation. In the
meantime, all energy has been directed towards
the situation has been likely the result of a "don't follow"
policy. The situation is a continuation of the same.

107
October

On September 6, 1914, the 1914 Conference opened
in Manila with delegates from Australia, France,
and several other countries. The United States and
United Kingdom. The conference was opened by the arrival of
Mr. Jones, who was credited to the United States. The
conference was held in Manila. The official, and the
conference, was held in Manila. The conference was held in
Manila, however, and it was closed by the arrival of
Europe at that time. The fall of the European balance was

108
January

The work of the conference was quickly completed and
on September 6, 1914, the Treaty establishing the
signed. The treaty was signed by the United States, sponsored
by the Philippines, which signed the treaty on behalf
the principle of equal rights and self-determination of
people" and "to promote self-government and to secure the

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January, pp. 114, 115.

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January, pp. 114, 115.

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January for the United States and necessary duties
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independence of all countries whose peoples desire it and are able to undertake its responsibilities." As a statement of principles, it was intended to refute any allegation that SEATO was based upon, or supported, colonialism. Secretary Dulles called the Charter "the most momentous product of the conference."

Despite the speed and scope of the conference, the meeting in Manila was not totally free of last minute modifications. Pakistan wanted to insure that collective defense would be operable against any aggression, not just communist aggression. This ran counter to the United States desires and resulted in a United States "understanding" being attached to the Treaty. The Austrialians announced that their forces would not be committed to any intra-Commonwealth (i.e., India-Pakistan) dispute. The rapidity with which the Manila Pact was approved and signed proved to be something of a propaganda tool for the communists and even for the neutralists. Obviously, the conference had been presented with a prepared text which was not open to full discussion and debate. The concept was Western, and the organization was formed in that light. As an instrument for the defense of the Orient, SEATO was significantly lacking in Oriental thought, origin, and membership.

The provisions of the Treaty were more flexible than those of the NATO pact and were, in general, quite loosely

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The provisions of the Treaty were more flexible than
those of the NATO Pact and were, in general, quite loosely

worded. The purposes of the organization were set forth but were subject to widely varying interpretations by the signers. Yet, there were portions of the Treaty which were precise and familiar. In part, the Treaty iterated those provisions of the ANZUS Treaty and the United States-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty which related to the commitments and obligations of the parties concerned; in part, it iterated the intentions of the Colombo Plan¹¹⁰ to promote economic welfare in the area.

There were, however, three innovations in the Treaty which were noteworthy. First, the area of the Treaty which was delineated specifically excluded Hong Kong and Formosa. Included were the "entire territories of the Asian Parties" south of 21°30'N (Art. VIII). This was significant for the United States, for it meant a commitment to the mainland of Southeast Asia for the first time. It was in this connection that the United States had included its "understanding" concerning aggression. In the words of Secretary Dulles, the "understanding" reflected "the special position of the United States as the only one of the signatories who does not have any territory in the treaty area."¹¹¹

¹¹⁰An economic assistance program of Commonwealth origin which includes all the countries of Southeast Asia and with which the United States affiliated in 1951.

¹¹¹Senate Executive Report, 83rd Congress, 2d Session, p. 4.

[illegible]

and have the authority in the treaty area."

iii
General Economic Report, First Supplement, 10 October,
and with which the United States entered in 1951.

Second was the provision (para. 1 of Art. V) which extended the coverage of the Treaty to state or territories specifically designated by the signatories, provided they consented to such coverage. Attached to the Treaty was a protocol which so designated Cambodia, Laos, and the free territory of Vietnam.

Third was the portion (para. 2 of Art. IV) which provided for united action against not only armed attack but against subversion from within. This was controversial inasmuch as it appeared to be tacitly in support of colonialism and in opposition to political change even if change should be desired by the people. Moreover, it connoted external interference in domestic affairs. Walter Lippmann, in commenting on the Treaty, discussed it as: "The first formal instrument in modern times which is designed to license international intervention in internal affairs."¹¹²

The Treaty, with attached protocol, was forwarded to the Senate for its advice and consent on November 10, 1954. In his covering letter, President Eisenhower drew attention to those portions of the Treaty which dealt with the area covered, the membership, and the designation of non-signatory states or territories by proposing that any future change in

¹¹²New York Herald Tribune, September 14, 1954.

Second was the provision (para 1 of Art. V) which extended the coverage of the Treaty to those of territories specifically designated by the signatories, provided they consented to such coverage. Attached to the Treaty was a protocol which in extended Canada, Laos, and the Free Territory of Trieste.

Third was the provision (para 2 of Art. VI) which provided the United Nations against not only states which but against aggression from within. This was controversial inasmuch as it appeared to be likely in support of collective action and in opposition to political change even if change should be desired by the people. However, it contained external intervention in domestic affairs. Under the terms of the Treaty, discussed in the "Constitutional Instrument" in which it was designed to provide international responsibility in internal affairs. The Treaty, with attached protocols, was forwarded to the United Nations for its advice and consent on November 10, 1948. In his covering letter, President Truman stated that the Treaty is to be given to the Senate with the aim of covering the territories, and the realization of non-aggression is emphasized by proposing that any future change in

any of these articles would require new Senate advice and consent.¹¹³

The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations met November 11 in an effort to demonstrate their recognition of the importance of the Treaty. Because of the lateness of the session, however, a further discussion was put off until the next Congress. When the Committee did again meet to consider the Treaty, the party in power had changed; but the attitude of the Committee remained encouraging. In the course of the hearings, the Committee expressed pleasure that its earlier belief in the practicability of collective defense in Southeast Asia had been borne out and satisfaction that the Treaty contained the permissive feature of meeting danger in accordance with constitutional processes--the "Monroe Doctrine" formula.¹¹⁴

The only matter of substance into which the Committee delved was that concerning possible plans or intentions to create a standing local defense force in the area. The Committee was concerned "lest the United States might be overtaxing itself" in view of its other treaty obligations. Secretary Dulles replied to the effect that the United

¹¹³United States Congress, Senate Executive Report K, 83d Congress, 2d Session.

¹¹⁴United States Senate, Executive Report, No. 1, 84th Congress, 1st Session.

any of these articles which would have been of value to the

Committee.¹¹²

The House Committee on Foreign Relations met (May-

1917) in an effort to demonstrate their responsibility to the

importance of the Treaty. Secretary of the House of the

Committee, however, a further discussion was not held until the

next Congress. When the Committee did again meet to con-

sider the Treaty, the House is now not enough; but the

records of the Committee showed otherwise. In the

course of the hearings, the Committee reported (March

1917) the matter before in the responsibility of collective

action in foreign affairs and how far we can go and what

time and the Treaty contained the necessary terms of

action which is necessary with constitutional process—

the "Treaty Question" Committee.¹¹³

The only matter of importance here which the Committee

dealt with was the proposed Committee's view on independence to

secure a standing local body in the area. The

Committee was concerned that the United States might be

overlooking itself in view of its other treaty obligations.

Secretary of the Committee was the effect that the United

¹¹² United States Congress, House Committee on Foreign Relations, 65th Congress, 1st Session, 1917, H. R. 100, 1st Session, 1917, H. R. 100, 1st Session, 1917.

¹¹³ United States Congress, House Committee on Foreign Relations, 65th Congress, 1st Session, 1917, H. R. 100, 1st Session, 1917, H. R. 100, 1st Session, 1917.

States had no intention of building up a large local force but would rely upon the deterrent power of mobile striking forces and that he had so stated at Manila.¹¹⁵ Without further ado, the Committee reported favorably, and the Senate approved the Treaty on February 1 by a vote of 82 to 1.¹¹⁶

As a measure of United States policy in Southeast Asia, SEATO had the full concurrence of both political parties in the Congress and represented a genuine consensus within the government. There were shortcomings in the Treaty, of course, the most serious of which was the absence of important Asian nations from its membership--but over all it appeared to represent a more dynamic approach to the problem of containing communism and to be in consonance with the current doctrine of "massive retaliation." It was for the United States the culmination of a program of seeking military alliances and brought United States participation in such alliances to every continent except Africa. Curiously, it came at a time when communism seemed to be retreating from a policy of seeking military alliances, particularly in Asia.

¹¹⁵Ibid.

¹¹⁶The New York Times, February 2, 1955.

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1. The first step is to identify the problem or question that needs to be addressed. This involves understanding the context and the specific requirements of the task.

as a source of United States policy in Indonesia

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parties in the Congress and were elected a Justice of the Supreme Court.

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is such a large number of people who are

and 64 females all captured male until a few weeks of winter

Continued from a column of reading material, 1950-1951.

Specifically, it is hypothesized that:

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CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION

The record of the United States in Southeast Asia from the end of the war until 1950 was, generally, one of missed opportunities or, worst of all, indecision. There was an interest in the area. There was a feeling of sympathy toward the aspirations of colonial peoples for independence. But United States participation in Southeast Asian affairs was conducted within the limiting parameters normally assigned to matters of secondary importance. The big show was anti-communism, and it was centered in Europe.

This preoccupation with Europe, and particularly Western Europe, conditioned post-war policies of the United States for all other areas. Concern for developments in Europe dictated policies which were assessed first for their effect upon that region. In Southeast Asia, the result was less than successful.

First, in adapting the Europe-oriented policy of status quo and containment to Southeast Asia, the United States was temporizing with the often-asserted principle of self-determination. To the leaders of independence movements in Southeast Asia, this was sufficient to cause them to move toward neutralism and away from the West. Lost was the advantage held at the end of the war when the peoples of

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION

The course of the United States in Southeast Asia from the end of the war until 1950 was, generally, one of least opposition or, worse at all, indifference. There was no interest in the area. There was a feeling of sympathy toward the aspirations of colonial peoples for independence. But within State Department in Southeast Asia affairs was conducted within the existing framework usually assigned to matters of secondary importance. The area was anti-communist, and it was treated as such. While cooperation with Europe, and particularly Western Europe, conditioned some of the policies of the United States for all other areas, Southeast Asia developed in Europe directed policies which were regarded like the Latin American area. In Southeast Asia, the result was less than successful.

First, in seeking the Europe-oriented policy of containment and commitment to business with the United States was beginning with the Asian-oriented attitude of self-determination. To the leaders of Indonesian movements in Southeast Asia, this was unlikely to cause them to move toward political and unity from the West. Just as the Americans said at the end of the war that the people of

Southeast Asia looked to the United States as a champion of independence and the most likely source of support for their aspirations. The opportunity to exert influence in Southeast Asia that could have smoothed the transition from colonialism to independence was missed. And with it went the chance to keep the local communists from posing as a liberating force. Second was the curious inconsistency of trying to adapt a policy of massive retaliation to an area for which it was singularly inappropriate. In underdeveloped areas, such as Southeast Asia and Southern China, there were, and are, few targets whose destruction by nuclear attack would adversely affect guerrilla warfare as practiced by the Viet-minh. Moreover, the really effective enemy weapon, subversion, would be undeterred.

There was, however, one unexpected aspect which was favorable: the Soviet Union, like the United States, was neglecting Southeast Asia in favor of Europe. In essence, the post-war period found the independence movements in Southeast Asia left mostly to their own devices. In the United States, this indifference toward Southeast Asia was not confined to the Executive Branch of the government. Within the Congress, there were exponents of a more positive policy, but they were few and generally unappreciated. Some, such as Congressman Judd, were knowledgeable and were so accepted; others, particularly West Coast Republicans,

were regarded as more partisan than nationalistic in their criticisms.

Paradoxically, the era of direct involvement in Southeast Asia--the period 1950-1954--was beset with internal partisanship within the United States. It was the time of McCarthyism and of the divisive activities of a Presidential election. Yet, despite campaign promises of widespread change, the transfer from one administration to another was accomplished without a reorientation of policy for Southeast Asia. What commitments had been made were honored; what had been started was carried forward. The end product was more bi-partisan than the political climate would seemed to have permitted.

Events in Southeast Asia since 1954 have, inter alia, solidified the United States commitment in the area and highlighted the real loss we sustained as a result of our "hands off" policy in the pre-1950 period. The basic objectives of American policy in Southeast Asia, political freedom for all and friendly relationships among countries,¹ remain valid today. Attaining them, however, is not as easy as it was in 1950 when there was an opportunity for a positive program to strengthen the area politically and economically. What emerged instead was a program of response to communist

¹Department of State Bulletin, November 21, 1955, p. 843.

were regarded as some further form of nationalistic in their

deliberations.

Consequently, the new or latest movement in

European economic policy 1950-1954--was based with the

same perspective as the United States. It was the

idea of economic and of the division of labor

between nations. Yet, despite the division of

labor, the United States was not a participant in

any of the economic policy of the United States.

For European Asia, that movement had been made

known, and that policy was being followed. The end

product was some European form of political union

would result in 1954.

Every in European Asia since 1954 have, after all,

existed the United States movement in the area and

ignited the last or perhaps as a result of the

old policy in the United States. The basic objective of

European policy in European Asia, political freedom for all

and political relationships among countries, remain valid

policy. Although this, however, is not as easy as it was in

1950 when there was no responsibility for a positive program to

strengthen the new political and economic. When

any of these was a program of economic or political

relationships.

¹Journal of State Relations, November 11, 1954, p.

initiative--a program which placed the formulation of United States policies in the hands of the communists.

In Indochina, the goal of a united, free Vietnam appears to be as far from realization as it has ever been. Political viability has not been achieved and without it, no lasting solution to the problem is possible.

On balance, therefore, the conclusion must be drawn that United States actions, or lack of them, in the immediate post-war years in Southeast Asia constituted a significant handicap to achieving success once the struggle was joined. The handicap will not be reduced nor can success be expected unless and until there is political stability in the area. A military solution to a political problem cannot produce the desired results.

1954-1955--a program which placed the emphasis on United States policy in the hands of the communists.

By 1954, the goal of a united, free Vietnam

appears to be as far from realization as it has ever been.

Political stability has not been achieved and without it,

no lasting solution to the problem is possible.

In January, 1954, the communists must be given

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
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